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This dissertation empirically explores how external influences in both
the education and religious spheres affects human capital accumulation. Chap-
ter 1 explores the effects of people’s attachment to religion on religious par-
ticipation and on human capital by studying the sexual abuse scandal within
the Catholic Church. Reporting by major media outlets in 2002 revealed a
staggering amount of sexual abuse by clerics and its ongoing cover-up in the
United States by the Church’s hierarchy. This news shook many of the faith-
ful’s trust in the religious institution and led to a crisis of faith. The intensity of
the scandal, as measured by the number of allegations against clerics, differed
across the dioceses in the country. Exploiting this variation with a difference-
in-differences strategy, I find that dioceses with a high number of allegations
experienced diminishment in demand for religion across several different mea-
sures. Parents are less likely to have their children receive sacraments and
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attend parochial schools. Parish membership declines by more than 7.1 per-
cent, and student enrollment falls by 13.2 percent.
Chapter 2 further investigates how the abuse scandal affected human
capital accumulation. The crisis had effects that extend beyond religious at-
tachment. I present evidence that the clerical abuse scandal leads to worsening
mortality rates related to deaths of despair, i.e. deaths related to suicide, acci-
dental drug overdose, or liver disease. In particular, at the county level there is
an increase in the incidence of high mortality rates of respectively 1.2 percent
and 1.8 percent for accidental overdoses and suicides for middle aged men.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Andrew Lee. We study the causal impact
of noise pollution on educational outcomes of students attending public insti-
tutions in the state of Texas. We research this through the setting of wind
farms, whose turbines are a source of low-frequency noise pollution. Using
geolocation information, we identify which schools lie near wind farms. Under
a difference-in-differences framework, we compare schools that are in the vicin-
ity wind turbines with similar schools that are not. Using publicly available
data on public schools, we estimate the negative impact of noise pollution on
academic achievement. The installation of wind turbines leads to 0.046 stan-
dard deviation reduction in reading scores on standardized tests, and there are
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Chapter 1
How do Abuse Allegations Affect the
Religious Participation of Catholics?
1
1.1 Introduction
One would be hard-pressed to deny the influence that faith has had on
both cultures and societies. Religious institutions have had varying impacts
across key areas of civic life. For instance, whole education networks, hospital
systems, and charitable organizations are sponsored (if not run) by religious
entities. At the same time, faith plays an important role in many individuals’
lives. As of 2014, 77 percent of Americans are religiously affiliated with 55
percent praying daily and 36 percent attending weekly services (Pew Resarch
Center (2014)). Even with this prevalence, religion remains under-researched
in the economic literature.1
The Catholic sexual abuse scandal provides an opportunity to add to
this relatively nascent literature and study how people react to a crisis of faith.
In 2002, The Boston Globe broke the major story about sexual abuse of minors
by clergy within in the Catholic Church. What started locally in the Boston
area quickly spread throughout the United States. This ripple effect led to the
number of allegations against priests to skyrocket. In a relatively short time,
people learned not only about the abuse allegations but also about an extensive
cover-up of these allegations by the hierarchy in the Catholic Church. This
negative news led people to lose trust not only in the religious institution but
also in the faith leaders who they had held up as being closest to God. Simply
put, many Catholics questioned their faith. Beyond the general national news
1Iyer (2016) reviews the literature and shows that in recent years there has been an
increasing number of articles and interest in the economics of religion.
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coverage, areas had different exposures to this scandal due to number of local
offenders and due to the varying responses of the local Church leadership along
with the perceived levels of its complicity to the scandal.
For a variety of reasons, this crisis of faith could move people to respond
in ways that would decrease the demand for religion and affect human capital
outcomes. First, one could hypothesize that the negative publicity of the abuse
and associated cover-up might lead people to become disillusioned and leave
the religion. Additionally, one would expect parents to pull their children
from early religious education programs and schools to protect them. Third,
in Chapter 2 of this dissertation we also explore how this exploitation of minors
and a violation of the people’s trust may have cut off a lifeline where people
had social, emotional, and psychological support.
My econometric strategy to examine how this crisis of faith affected
the Catholic faithful is to exploit the variation in the exposure of the scandal,
as measured by the number of public allegations, across dioceses, i.e., church
juridical regions, in a difference-in-differences framework. I compare dioceses
that had a high number of allegations in 2002, specifically those in the upper
quartile, to those that did not.2 To do this, I obtain allegation information
from the nonprofit Bishop Accountability, and I utilize a new set of participa-
tion data from the Official Catholic Directory.
2This threshold for the number of first-time accused clerics is greater than five. The
results of this chapter are robust to setting a higher or lower threshold as shown in Appendix
A.
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First, I find that demand for religion declines. Religious participation
decreases across several different measures. The number of Catholics con-
nected to a parish church decreases by 7.1 percent, and infant baptisms drops
by 7.9 percent. This totals to about 2.5 million less parishioners for the fifty
treated dioceses, or about 14.1 percent of the increase in the number of ex-
Catholics since 2000 as measured by the Center for Applied Research in the
Apostolate (CARA).
Second, school enrollment, both a secondary measurement of participa-
tion and an indicator of human capital accumulation, suffers. The number of
students who attend diocesan sponsored elementary schools declines by 13.2
percent and high school enrollment by 17.1 percent. Together this is nearly
180,000 students which represents 60 percent of the total decline in all private
school enrollment over the past two decades in the US. Additionally, while the
demand for Catholic diocesan schools drops, the effect on other, both Catholic
and non-Catholic, private schools differ. For instance, nonreligious private
schools experience an increase in high school grade level enrollment.
This study contributes to the larger literature on the economics of re-
ligion. In particular, the failures of the institution of the Catholic Church led
people away, and I show that this change in the faith experience of Catholics
is linked to larger issues affecting human capital outcomes like education and
health. This is in a similar vein to Clingingsmith, Khwaja and Kremer (2009)
which shows that the Hajj can be life changing for those who make the pil-
grimage. Along the same lines, papers have shown other ways that religious
4
institutions affect not only the demand for religion but also the well-being of
people. For instance, religious leaders can influence followers behavior (Bassi
and Rasul, 2017), and missionary work has long lasting, i.e., multigenerational,
impacts on human capital ((Valencia Caicedo, 2018); (Calvi, Hoehn-Velasco
and Mantovanelli, 2020)). Catholic education systems also have long term
effects. Papers find that students at Catholic high schools have higher grad-
uation rates and a greater chance to attend and finish college ((Evans and
Schwab, 1995); (Neal, 1997)).
This work contributes to an existing literature studying the impacts of
the scandal. Studies have shown that the scandal negatively impacted religious
giving, religious employment, and Catholic education ((Hungerman, 2013);
(Bottan and Perez-Truglia, 2015); (Dills and Hernández-Julián, 2012)). The
link between religiosity and state welfare has also been examined (Dills and
Hernández-Julián, 2014). My paper complements these studies by bringing
direct measures of religiosity and religious practice, such as parish membership,
churches, and sacraments, from the previously non digitized data of the Official
Catholic Directory and a new dimension of detail at the level of schools to bear
on this question. I find that the response differs among the types of Catholic
schools and other private schools. Overall, the contribution of this chapter
describes how a crisis of faith hurt participation in both the liturgical and




In a pastoral letter, the Most Reverend J. Douglas Deshotel, bishop of
the Diocese of Lafayette, recently lamented that the public first confronted
the reality of the clerical sexual abuse back in 1984 when a Louisiana priest
was accused and eventually plead guilty to molesting more than 30 children.
Scandal would resurface again in the 1990s when some dioceses had to pay
out millions of dollars in settlements.3 Even with these events, the scandal
did not rise to the forefront of the public’s consciousness until 2002 when
The Boston Globe published the exposé on sexual abuse of minors by clerics.
What prompted this investigative reporting was concern about actions taken
by Church officials in response to a series of accusations of sexual abuse made
against John Geoghan, a Boston priest. Bishops had allowed the priest to
serve in many parishes despite his checkered history.
This reporting was a watershed event. There were growing reports
throughout the United States about priests who sexually abused minors, and
the news coverage correspondingly increased. The number of allegations against
priests skyrocketed. The John Jay Report, commissioned by the US bishops,
found that in 2002 dioceses received notification of 3,399 incidents of past
3For instance, an important case dealing with scandal before the Boston crisis dealt with
the former Diocese of Dallas priest, Rudy Kos. In 1997 a lawsuit against the diocese and
Kos, a jury initially awarded $120 million to victims, but the case was eventually settled on
appeal with the diocese agreeing to pay $23.4 million. Kos was convicted and sentenced to
life in prison in 1998.
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abuse. While this scandalous behavior of priests had been documented before
in isolated incidents4 across the country which resulted in some dioceses hav-
ing to pay out millions of dollars in settlements, what became apparent was
that the hierarchy of the Church had previous knowledge of many of these ac-
cused priests.5 The public had been aware of past singular incidents of abuse,
but now a case could be made that the Church hierarchy was complicit or
at least ineffective in how it handled abuse cases. Discoveries were made that
bishops moved priests around after priests underwent psychological treatment,
and they did not report offenses to legal authorities. A case could be made
that the leadership concealed the truth in order to avoid negative publicity.
For many, the scandal was more than just a small group of clerics who
had done the most abominable things to innocent children. What was just
as repulsive was the appearance that those who were entrusted with their
pastoral and spiritual care, i.e. the bishops, had acted recklessly by keeping
credibly accused priests in ministry and seemingly had protected the abusers.
The faithful’s trust was shaken in those who they saw as closest to God. It
is understandable that this scandal would lead some to doubt their religion’s
leaders and, in general, to enter into a crisis of faith.6 Anecdotally, there
4The John Jay Report estimates that only about 10 percent of the eventually reported
incidents of abuse from 1985 and before were reported to dioceses by 1985. The 2002 scandal
brought several new allegations from the past to the forefront.
5In fact, journalists at The Dallas Morning News found at the time of the scandal that
nearly two-thirds of US bishops had let accused priests to continue working after allegations
were made.
6For instance, Jones (2019) reported that 22 percent of Catholics polled questioned
whether to remain in the Catholic Church after the 2002 scandal.
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was much anger in the pews, and some people quit attending Sunday mass
altogether.
While, at the national level, the whole Church was indicted by this
scandal, there were local differences in the exposure of this crisis. There was
widespread spatial variation in where the allegations were made against priests.
Certain areas of the country, like the Northeast, were more barraged with
accusations than other parts. The faithful depending on what diocese they
lived in had different intensities of exposure to the scandal.
1.2.2 The Church in the United States
The Church is separated into geographic, juridical areas known as arch-
dioceses or dioceses.7 In the United States, there are 176 territorial dioceses.
Currently, each state has at least one diocese while Texas has the most with
fifteen. Furthermore, only four dioceses cross state borders.8
While some dioceses have more than one bishop, each is headed by a
single bishop, who is also known as the ordinary. The ordinary has as his
charge the pastoral and spiritual care of all the Catholics who reside in his
diocese. To assist in this ministry, the bishop ordains priests and deacons and
7An archdiocese is usually just a diocese with a larger catholic population than other
dioceses in the region. For the purpose of this chapter, diocese will refer to both a diocese
or an archdiocese.
8The Diocese of Gallup lies in the states of Arizona and New Mexico, the Diocese of
Wilmington traverses the Delaware-Maryland border, the Diocese of Norwich in Connecticut
has a small portion in New York, and the Archdiocese of Washington covers the District of
Columbia along with a portion of southern Maryland
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assigns them to their apostolic ministries, usually church parishes. The bishop
is the only one who has the direct authority to move priests around within
their own diocese. As mentioned above, bishops took criticism for moving
around abusers from place to place.
A typical diocese is divided up into parishes so that the local church can
more easily meet the pastoral and spiritual needs of its members. The norm is
that each parish church is headed by a pastor appointed by the bishop who is in
charge of caring for those who live in the parish boundary.9 The usual term of
office for a pastor is six years, but it can be renewed by the bishop. However, a
church member could come into contact with several different priests that serve
the diocese over the years even if she never moved parishes. The overwhelming
majority of parish boundaries are geographic and determined by the Catholic
population in the area. As such, the boundary of an urban parish may be only
several square city blocks while the jurisdictional reach of a rural parish could
stretch several square miles.
Whom the bishop assigns to a parish church is of utmost importance
because the parish is the center of a practicing Catholic’s faith experience. A
Catholic can attend Sunday and, possibly, daily mass, take religion classes,
receive counseling from a minister, perform social outreach, and socialize all
at the local church. Key to this faith experience are rituals centered around
life events, and the most important are the Sacraments of Initiation.
9Additionally, some parishes may have parochial vicars, or associate pastors.
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The Sacraments of Initiation are received when someone enters the
Catholic faith. They include Baptism, First Communion, and Confirmation.
Baptism is the first sacrament that an individual receives when one comes
into the Catholic Church. While people may be baptized if they convert later
during adulthood, it is the norm that infants are baptized within the first year
after birth. In the United States, it is usually the case that First Communion
chronologically follows Baptism. Baptized children are able to receive First
Communion once they reach the age of seven, and they have the required
preparation. After receiving this sacrament, the Catholic can fully partici-
pate in the mass. Finally, Confirmation is typically the last sacrament that
a minor receives. Depending on the local diocese, children might receive this
sacrament while they are in elementary school. However, the vast majority of
dioceses have teenagers preparing to receive this sacrament when they are in
middle school or high school. Upon receiving Confirmation, the person is fully
initiated into the faith.
Another fundamental way that people experience the Catholic Church
is through the Catholic school system. Enrollment informs us about religious
participation because the faithful are encouraged to send their children to
Catholic schools. In fact, it is a common practice that families who attend a
parish church receive a discount on tuition at that particular parish’s parochial
school. Catholic schools not only educate their students according standard
curricula but also aim to form them to be disciples and practitioners of the
Catholic faith. Common practices during school time include theology classes,
10
weekly mass or prayer services, and sacramental preparation for first reconcil-
iation and communion.
While all of these ways definitely speak to religious participation, look-
ing at school enrollment also says something directly about the market for
private schools. In particular, learning about how people react to the scandal
in regards to their choice in education informs us about the demand curve for
Catholic and other private schools. The predicted decrease in demand has ram-
ifications that potentially extend beyond the sphere of religion. When parents
choose to forgo education in the Catholic school system for their children, one
may question how this will affect the accumulation of human capital, not only
in standard skill and knowledge acquisition but also in the many dimensions
of human formation which religious schools emphasize.
Even with the similarity of mission, in the United States, there are
generally speaking two different types of schools within the Catholic school
system. The first, diocesan schools, are governed and receive curriculum di-
rection from diocesan officials. Parochial schools, usually serving students in
kindergarten through eighth grade, are tied to a particular parish, and the pas-
tor has at least a minimum direct care of the school through the hiring of the
school principal. Diocesan high schools tend to be regional. The other type,
non-diocesan private Catholic schools, have a much more varied background.
For instance, some of the schools are governed by a private lay board while
others are sponsored by a religious congregation, such as the Jesuits. Under
these circumstances, these schools operate under the auspices of local dioce-
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ses, but a diocese has no direct control of the school. These schools get their
institutional identity not only by being Catholic but also from the charism of
their sponsoring group. It seems plausible that the abuse scandal could affect
enrollment differently at these types of schools.
1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Data
The main identification strategy relies on information gleaned from the
non-profit Bishop Accountability, incorporated in Massachusetts. The mission
of this organization is to hold the church leadership accountable for the han-
dling of abuse allegations. Key to this is the transparency of these allegations
against Catholic Church officials, including bishops, priests, deacons, brothers,
and sisters. The organization provides a diocesan list of each church official
who has been accused of sexual abuse of a minor along with supporting public
documentation of the allegation, including court documents, diocesan press
releases, and news articles. As such, one can construct a data set, that has for
each accused cleric the date that an allegation was first publicly known. From
this, I can tally by year and by diocese the number of first-time allegations
independent of when the alleged abuse occurred.
In conjunction with the allegation data, the Official Catholic Directory
(OCD) is a primary source of data. Published annually by P.J. Kenedy and
Sons, the OCD holds a wealth of information, including parish assignments,
institution listings, individual priest assignments, and general statistics for
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each Catholic diocese in the United States. To my knowledge, I am the first
to use this complete data source. For this analysis, I use data from 1991 to
2016. Key variables of interest deal with Catholic participation and identity.
In particular, the OCD has information on the Catholic population, the num-
ber of Baptisms, First Communions, Confirmations, and enrollment figures in
religious education programs and Catholic schools in each US diocese. Addi-
tional diocesan school enrollment data for 1997-2018 comes from the National
Catholic Educational Association (NCEA). I complement this with the bi-
ennial Private School Universe Survey (PSUS) from the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) for the years 1991-2016 which has grade level
enrollment at the school level.
Intercensal demographic county level data, including race and age,
comes from the US Census Bureau. Additionally, county level data on per-
sonal income comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). County
level data is aggregated to the diocesan level by using a county to diocese
cross walk.
1.3.2 Allegations and Treatment
In order to have a measure of the exposure of the sexual abuse scandal,
I count the number of allegations that each diocese has. To have better under-
standing of this metric, it is best to first consider the type of allegations that
will be counted. Similar to Hungerman (2013) and Bottan and Perez-Truglia
(2015), a sexual abuse allegation is counted if it is publicly leveled against
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a Catholic Church official, such as bishop, priest, deacon, brother, sister, or
seminarian. An additional requirement is that the allegation has to be the
first-time that the official has been publicly accused. If a priest has served in
multiple dioceses, the diocese where the accusation takes place is considered
the primary diocese of record in the data. Furthermore, the year when the
allegation is first made public (and not when the abuse occurred) is when one
expects the negative news to effect the diocese. Under this framework, public
allegations made in 2003 and 2005 against a priest that occurred in 1975 while
he worked at a school in diocese x counts as an allegation for the diocese x
in 2003 only. Finally, this chapter does not distinguish between allegations
that eventually result in settlements or convictions, those that are deemed
credible, or those not considered unsubstantiated by Church officials. This
measure relies on the negative shock that results from the public revelation
that a Catholic official has been accused of sexual abuse.
Figure 1.1 presents the tally of first-time allegations levelled against
Catholic clergy and religious for 1991 to 2018. As one might expect, the
number of allegations are very low leading up to the 2002 reporting by The
Boston Globe. At that time, the US Catholic Church experienced a spike in
first-time public allegations. In subsequent years, the number of allegations
dropped but the level was higher than the years prior to the 2002 scandal.
This year clearly stands out as when news about the sex scandal was publicly
made known.10
10Another spike also occurs in 2018 which is a result of a new round of allegations resulting
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This study exploits the difference in intensity of the publicity of the
abuse scandal. I measure the intensity by counting the number of first-time
allegations in each diocese that occurred in 2002 when news of the national
scandal first broke.11 One might wonder what is the impact of the scandal
across the United States. As news spread, many people were affected, and
anecdotally many people left the faith. This project is unable to measure
this aggregate effect of the scandal; rather, it looks at the local effect of a
diocese’s susceptibility to the scandal on participation, i.e. the relative effect
by comparing high allegation to low allegation dioceses.
I consider dioceses in the upper quartile of the number of allegations
in 2002 as treated. The cutoff is more than five first-time allegations in 2002.
Under this standard, fifty locales are considered high allegation dioceses. Fig-
ure 1.2 delineates the borders of the dioceses in the continental US and shows
the high allegation and low allegation dioceses, and Table A.1 provides the
from two major news events that happened in the summer of that year. First, allegations
against the former archbishop and cardinal, Theodore McCarrick, were deemed credible by
the Archdiocese of New York in June. Second, the report from the Pennsylvania grand
jury’s investigation into Catholic Church sexual abuse was released in August. A host of
previously undisclosed allegations against priests were made public in the report. These
two events led to a nationwide call for transparency. Dioceses and religious orders released
historical lists of priests who had credible allegations leveled against them. The first of these
entities began to roll out the credibly accused lists in the fall of 2018 and others followed
suit throughout 2019. There are still some dioceses who have not released lists.
11The total number of allegations seems like a reasonable gauge of intensity because the
publicity from even one allegation could be broadcast throughout the diocese by any number
of media outlets. Yet, one may argue that the exposure of the scandal does not depend on
the total number of allegations and suggest that the number of allegations per capita would
be a better measure. When the chapter uses the number per person, the results qualitatively
hold and are included in Appendix A.
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number of allegations in each of the treated dioceses in 2002. The analysis
and results which follow in this chapter qualitatively hold when the cutoff is
relaxed or tightened, and this is discussed in Appendix A.
Dioceses that have a much longer established history are more likely to
have a large number of allegations. Many in the Northeast experienced a flood
of first-time allegations in 2002. Additionally, those with the most allegations
tend to be those with the largest population. The dioceses of Baltimore,
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia comprised about
21 percent of the US Catholic population in 2002. Additionally, the spread of
the scandal reaches some Midwestern and Western dioceses. Table 1.1 provides
summary statistics by high allegation and low allegation dioceses. The average
high allegation diocese is larger than the average low allegation diocese on a
number of key characteristics.
Inspecting how the number of allegations evolve between high allega-
tion and low allegation dioceses, high allegation dioceses on average have more
first-time annual allegations post 2002 than the low allegation dioceses. Fig-
ure 1.3 presents this information by year and treated group. The dashed line
represents the average cumulative number of first-time allegations for high al-
legation dioceses while the corresponding solid line for low allegation dioceses.
Before news of the scandal, high allegation dioceses had a slightly higher num-
ber of cumulative allegations. At the scandal in 2002, there is a steep jump
and relatively much smaller one for low allegation dioceses. The stark differ-
ence in cumulative allegations between the two types of dioceses is maintained
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throughout the period of this study’s analysis.
Due to the sudden jump in allegations, one might imagine that people
react to the news of the scandal immediately. However, there is a distinct
possibility that people may wait due to the way they process the information
of the news. First, they may exhibit a confirmation bias where they might
be slow to update their opinion about the Church. For instance, an indi-
vidual could chalk up news reports of the scandal to media bias.12 Second,
a person may employ a heuristic of optimism. Individuals may be wary to
think something so horrible could occur in their beloved religion. Under these
circumstances, repeated news of allegations would budge someone to change
their belief about the Church. Due to the cumulative effect of the negative
publicity that continued after the initial news in 2002, we may expect to see
both delayed and lingering effects of the crisis on participation variables.
1.3.3 Empirical Strategy
The intensity of the sexual abuse scandal varied across different dioceses
within the Church; as such, I can exploit that variation in a difference-in-
differences framework. In order to measure the intensity of variation, I count
the number of allegations as mentioned in the previous section. I have shown
12In fact, Mancini and Shields (2014) through a 2010 national survey find that increased
exposure to media reporting of the scandal is associated with increased public confidence
in the Church in being able to handle future sexual abuse cases. They argue that this may
be do to a boomerang effect which suggests that continual negative attention to one issue
might backfire in shaping public opinion. In other words, people may question the bias of
the reporting and form a defensive stance on the issue.
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that the number of allegations vary across dioceses. This number of new
allegations seems to be something that should be correlated with the scandal
in a particular locality. For example, I assume that more allegations would be
associated with more news reports and other public revelation clergy sexual
abuse. What this chapter then does is test for whether or not dioceses that
had a greater exposure to the scandal are related to the outcomes of interest:
religious participation and school enrollment.
The chapter estimates the causal impact of the scandal on the outcomes
of interest using the estimating equation for the preferred specification that
follows:
Ydt = β0 + β1Treatd × Postt + β2Xdt + ηd + νt + εdt (1.1)
Y is the diocesan level outcome for diocese d in year t, such as the log number
of infant baptisms. For this chapter, the preferred specification will use the
log of variables.13 Treatd, an indicator variable, is 1 if the diocese d was a
high allegation diocese in 2002. Postt, the other indicator variable, is 1 if
the year t is 2002 or later. β1 is the coefficient of interest that will give the
differential effect of having a experienced a higher volume of allegations in
the diocese on the chosen outcome. Xdt is a vector of diocesan level specific
characteristics, such as Hispanic percentage or per capita income. ηd is the
difference in outcome due to diocesan effect, νt represents the common shocks
13Other specifications include per capita, levels, and an index level. The index is calculated
as a ratio between the level in year t to the level in 2001 immediately before the abuse
scandal, i.e. Ydt =
leveldt
leveld,2001
. Results for the per capita measure are included in the
robustness section.
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to all dioceses for a specific year, and ε is the error term. This specification,
while primarily for the diocesan level, will be modified for relevant county and
school level outcomes.
The event study for the various outcomes of interest comes from mod-
ifying equation 1.1:
Ydt = β0 +
∑
T 6=2001
[β1TTreatd × 1(t = T )] + β2Xdt + ηd + νt + εdt (1.2)
The treatment variable Treatd is interacted with a set of indicators, 1(t = T ),
for each calendar year. As such, the yearly coefficients of interest are the β1T s.
I normalize β1,2001 to zero, so all coefficients are interpreted as changes relative
to the year before the news of the scandal broke. The rest follows as above.
In order to make this functional, I made some assumptions about the
model. Knowing that some of these are not testable, I conducted several
robustness checks to try other assumptions that also seem reasonable. With
these, the chapter gets qualitatively similar results. They are further detailed
in Appendix A. First, I find that the results are robust to contracting and
expanding the threshold for a treated diocese, showing that the results do not
come from cherry picking. The preferred specification includes approximately
the upper quartile of dioceses in terms of number allegations. This check
includes thresholds that look at the top fifteen, twenty, and forty percents of
dioceses. Second, the findings are also robust to changing the specification
of the outcome variable. Instead of the log of participation variables, the
chapter uses outcomes per one million people. Third, I employ a parametric
19
event study that controls for linear pre-trends, and qualitatively similar results
hold. Finally, I use kernel propensity score matching on covariates to get more
comparable groups between the high and low allegation dioceses.
1.4 Results: Participation
1.4.1 Sacraments of Initiation
This study looks at the effect of the crisis on religious demand. I am
able to get at a more direct measurement of religious participation by utilizing
the OCD data than previous literature. I have digitized a unique data set
which provides the number of people who have received the Sacraments of
Initiation, which are Baptism, First Communion, and Confirmation, in each
diocese. Each of these give a unique perspective into the way that the sex
abuse scandal has had on the Catholic faithful’s religious participation.
Baptism is the first sacrament that someone receives when one comes
into the Catholic Church. It is the norm that Catholic families have their
children baptized within the first year after their birth. As such, the parents
and the godparents profess the faith of the infant in the Baptism ritual. One
expects that parents wary from the abuse scandal to avoid baptizing their
newborn infants.
Using similar reasoning, one would expect a drop in the number of
children who receive First Communion. Baptized children are able to receive
First Communion once they reach the age of seven. One of the requirements
is that a child receives sacramental preparation through her parochial school
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(if she attends Catholic school) or through the parish’s religious education
program. If students are not enrolled in Catholic elementary schools, parents
would have to take the initiative to enroll their children in religious education
classes to receive this sacrament. Again, this chapter conjectures that parents
would be less willing to have young children involved in these church programs.
Finally, a minor is confirmed only after being baptized and usually after
receiving First Communion. In some cases, one may be confirmed at an early
age around the same time as when one receives First Communion. For most
of the dioceses in the United States, the norm is that children prepare for
Confirmation during their teenage years while in middle school or high school.
Initially, one would also expect that there would be fewer who would want to
be confirmed because of the scandal.
Overall, we can say that each of these measure religious participation
in unique ways. Baptism captures purely the attitudes of the parents. Sec-
ond, First Communion may additionally capture some concern about their
children’s welfare during the actual participation for reception of the sacra-
ment. Finally, Confirmation captures both of these concerns but also reflects
a child’s attitude.
Figure 1.4 provides event study plots derived from Equation 1.2 of the
effect of the scandal on the log number of infant baptisms on the left in Panel
A and on the log number of First Communions in Panel B. The difference in
how the outcomes evolve by diocese type is evident in the respective coefficient
plots. In the immediate years prior to the scandal of 2002, the coefficients for
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the infant baptism regression are close to zero. In the years following, the
estimates become negative almost immediately and are statistically significant
within five years of news of the scandal. The results are qualitatively similar
for First Communion. The delay in the effects possibly may be attributed
to four reasons. First, there may be a cumulative effect. While the crux of
the scandal occurred in 2002, high allegation dioceses continue to have more
first-time allegations than the control dioceses in the few years afterwards.
Parents may not have updated their beliefs until after an accumulation of
negative publicity. Second, the scandal could have driven young people away
from the faith more easily, but it takes some time for these cohorts to become
the dominant cohorts having children. Third, the data in the OCD is static
as it relies on the administrative reports of the dioceses that are reported in
lags. Finally, with regards to the age requirement, we would expect the larger
effects to happen beginning seven years after the scandal. In this case, this
captures all those who were not baptized initially and who now cannot receive
First Communion.
The estimates based on Equation 1.1 of the effect of the abuse scandal
on these sacraments is provided in Table 1.2. Results without incorporating
diocesan controls are presented in the first and third columns. These estimates
are negative and statistically significant. The magnitudes of the estimates,
in the second and fourth columns slightly decrease when I include controls,
which include the percentage of population that is Hispanic and per capita
income for both the infant population percentage for Baptism. Yet, they
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remain statistically significant. With controls included, I interpret that the
estimates imply that dioceses that had a high number of allegations in 2002
experience a 7.9 percent decline in infant baptisms and a 7.8 percent decrease
in First Communions. This amounts to 843 less infant baptisms and 698 less
First Communions for the average high allegation diocese based on the pre-
scandal means of these dependant outcomes. This evidence shows that parents
increasingly kept their infants and young children away from these rituals and
incorporation into the Catholic Church.
The fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.2 present the estimates of the
effect that the 2002 scandal has on the log number of Confirmations. The
magnitudes are much smaller than those of the other Sacraments of Initiation,
and they are too noisy to definitively conclude their sign. Why would this
sacrament, one in which minors predominantly receive, not experience the
same declines as the other initiation sacraments? Since the recipients are
usually older when they receive this sacrament, it seems sensible that both the
potential recipients and their parents have spiritually and culturally invested
more into the Catholic faith. As such, this chapter posits that they would
be less likely to end their training for this sacrament, which is key to their
formal relationship to the Catholic Church. Additionally, similar to First
Communions, one needs to be baptized in order to be confirmed. The long
term effect of the scandal may be only realized several years after 2002 if the
main driver is children not being baptized. Additionally, the farther out from
2002, one could expect the treatment to get much noisier because people could
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move and change dioceses. These constitute some of the possible reasons why
there is not a discernible effect.
1.4.2 Catholic Population
Another key statistic for religious participation is the number of Cath-
olics who are connected with a church parish through formal registration. The
OCD reports the diocesan Catholic population based on this standard. This
metric provides an overall sense of families and individuals who choose to
register with their local parish. However, this variable does not include those
who never register and still attend Sunday mass or participate in other parish
sponsored activities. Additionally, it takes time for a parish to update their
membership list when people move to another area or simply stop going to
church. Finally, as mentioned before, due to Confirmation bias and general
optimistic thinking, some marginal Catholics might be slow to update their
beliefs. As such, departures most likely will be realized in the data after a lag.
A time series of the evolution of the US Catholic population in the 176
geographical Latin Rite dioceses along with its corresponding proportion of the
total US population is presented in Figure 1.5. Over the last four decades the,
the Catholic population, represented by a solid line, has increased from around
47.8 million in 1980 to about 68.0 million in 2017. In the years preceding the
2002 abuse scandal, the population increased at a relatively constant rate to
61.8 million. Looking at the graph, it is evident that the slope of the population
curve has decreased in the years afterward. In fact, just as Hungerman (2013)
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noted, immediately following the crisis, the slope either flattened or became
negative. What is new to this project is the plot of the dashed line, i.e.
the percentage of the US population that is connected to Catholic parish,
and this is more telling. Until the late 1990s, the percent hovered near 21.5
percent. The proportion increases to a peak of 22.3 percent right after the
abuse crisis, then falls 1.2 percentage points through 2007, and hovers at this
new level throughout the rest of the timeline. While this time series is not
part of the causal evidence that the crisis caused this substantial drop in the
Catholic population, the figure informs descriptively what happened to the
broad participation of the faithful during this time.
Comparing high allegation to low allegation dioceses, Figure 1.6 dis-
plays the plot of event study for the log of the total Catholic population in
Panel A and provides us with this visual evidence. Prior to news of the scan-
dal, the coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The estimates
drop beginning in 2002 and become statistically significant 3 years after news
of the scandal broke. The effect continues to get larger until the estimates
plateau beginning around 2009.
The estimates for the difference-in-differences regression are presented
in the first two columns of Table 1.3. Similar to the sacramental outcomes
discussed above, the outcome is the log of the Catholic population in a dio-
cese. Both estimates are negative and statistically significant. With controls
added, the estimate -0.0741 is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
According to this specification, the 2002 abuse crisis causes about 7.1 percent
25
decrease in the Catholic population which is nearly 50,000 for the average high
allegation dioceses.
These results qualitatively hold if we use the per capita measure, i.e the
percent of the total diocesan population that is Catholic. These corresponding
estimates are in the third and fourth columns of Table 1.3. With controls
added, there is an estimated 1.61 percentage point drop in Catholic percentage
in the treated dioceses, corresponding to about 38,000 fewer people connected
a Catholic parish in the average affected diocese.
1.4.3 Catholic Parishes
Next, the chapter looks at the structural backbone of Catholicism.
Most people experience their faith through their local parish church. It is
through this unit that Catholics attend weekly services, participate in ser-
vice organizations, socialize with fellow churchgoers, and engage their spiri-
tual leaders. As mentioned in the background section, a territorial diocese is
divided up into parishes with their own geographical boundaries so that the
local church and meet the pastoral and spiritual needs of its members. The
growth in new parishes is largely determined by the number of Catholics in
the area.
With the reduction of individuals who formally associate with a Catholic
parish, what happens to the parishes? We might expect that the number of
individual parish churches to decrease for a number of reasons. First, as peo-
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ple leave the faith, there is a reduction in demand.14 Second, the scandal led
to many lawsuits. This coupled with fewer members led financial troubles for
dioceses. In order to cut budgets, parishes would close or be consolidated.
Panel B of Figure 1.6 offers the event study plot for parish churches.
The plot provides no evidence of differing pre-trends, and a decline is apparent
after news of the scandal broke. While the estimate of the year coefficient does
not become significant until a few years after the scandal, this is in line with
the timeline of closing of parishes.15
The estimates of the causal impact of the scandal on church parishes are
presented in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.3. The chapter finds that
parish closures increase so the number of churches declines about 7.8 percent,
or about 12.7 churches for the average high allegation diocese.
1.5 Results: Schools and Student Enrollment
1.5.1 Diocesan Schools
Among diocesan schools, I first look to the primary schools. The typical
Catholic elementary school is parochial, i.e. it is attached to the a parish.
In most cases, the school is on the same grounds as the parish church. A
14One might posit that it is the closing of parishes that may lead to people leaving the
faith. I argue that this is not the main mechanism at work. When a parish is closed or
consolidates, the people that were attached to the that parish are automatically assumed
into another parish church.
15Several dioceses began consultation in the early 2000s about closing and merging certain
churches due to population decline, lack of finances, and the shortages of priests. The
decrees to actually close the parishes only were promulgated after enough time had passed
for discernment and for the affected communities to adapt.
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regular practice at these schools is to have the parish priest(s) involved by,
perhaps, teaching a weekly religion class, visiting class rooms, celebrating the
school liturgy, and/or attending other school functions. It seems reasonable
that news of a clergy scandal within the diocese would cause parents to avoid
sending their children to these schools and decrease their demand for Catholic
education.
In Figure 1.7, the coefficient plots for the log number of diocesan ele-
mentary schools and log student enrollment are presented. Both panels give
positive visual evidence that there are parallel pre-trends. Immediately when
the scandal breaks, declines manifest for both the number of schools and stu-
dent enrollment. The estimates of the causal impact on diocesan elementary
schools are presented in Panel A of Table 1.4. With controls included, the
effect on the number of diocesan elementary schools and student enrollment
are decreases of about 13.2 percent and 13.2 percent, respectively. The aver-
age high allegation diocese experiences declines of about 9.5 schools and 2,900
students.
The chapter finds that diocesan secondary schools in high allegation
dioceses also experienced negative effects due to the 2002 abuse scandal. The
plots of the event studies for the log number of diocesan high schools and
log student enrollment are presented in Figure 1.8. Panel A makes it evident
that there is a rather quick decline in the number of high schools in the af-
fected dioceses. As seen in Panel B, the effect on log enrollment takes awhile
longer to manifest, around four years after it does for the log number of high
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schools. Since a major pipeline of diocesan high school students comes from
the parochial school system, it is reasonable that this could simply represent
the drop in elementary school enrollment that occurred in the immediate years
following 2002. Panel B of Table 1.4 provides the estimates of the effect of
the scandal on the number of diocesan high schools and enrollment when con-
trols are included. A high allegation dioceses sees a negative effect on high
schools and enrollment of 15.2 percent, or 1.1 schools, and 17.1 percent, or
680 students. Together with the estimated effect on enrollment for elementary
schools, this amounts to 180,000 total students, or about 8.0 percent of those
enrolled in all diocesan schools in 2001.
As a robustness exercise, I move analysis of the effect on school enroll-
ment from the OCD data set to the constructed one from the PSUS of the
NCES. Table 1.5 presents estimates of the effect of the scandal on elementary
and high school enrollment using the biennial NCES data. In particular, we
examine the log enrollment of first grade because this would mark the begin-
ning of an average student’s stint at a parochial school. With similar reasoning
for high schools, I measure the effect on the log of ninth grade enrollment.
The first column presents the estimates from the regression using a
modified Equation 1.1 with county level controls included. In Panel A, I find
that diocesan elementary schools in high allegation dioceses saw about a 6.7
percent decline in first grade enrollment. In the bottom panel, the estimate
suggests that diocesan high schools experienced a 9.4 percent drop in ninth
grade enrollment. While the magnitudes of these estimates are smaller than
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those presented from the diocesan level data, they are in the same direction
and tell similar stories. The number of diocesan schools and school enrollment
dropped due to the scandal.
1.5.2 Other Catholic Private Schools
As discussed above, one could expect that this scandal might affect
Catholic private schools differently than diocesan schools since the former are
not under direct control of their respective local diocese and get their identity
from their sponsoring organization. The first sign that this may be the case
is when I do not differentiate between diocesan and private schools in the
analysis. Table 1.6 provides the estimates of the effect on all Catholic schools.16
The results for elementary schools are qualitatively similar to those of diocesan
elementary schools shown in Table 1.4. What differs are the estimates for high
schools in Panel B. In fact, the estimated effect on all Catholic high schools is
less than half than that on diocesan high schools.
In order to get at the effect on private schools, I use the school level data
from the NCES. The second column of Table 1.5 is dedicated to non-diocesan
catholic schools. In Panel A, the effect is positive for elementary schools with
an estimate of 0.7 percent on first grade enrollment. The estimate is opposite
sign of the one for diocesan schools although this estimate is not statistically
significant. The corresponding estimate for secondary schools in panel tells
16Additionally, Table A.7 provides estimates on the log of these school variables utilizing
data from the NCEA. Both this and Table 1.6 tell a similar story that the effects are atten-
uated for high schools when both diocesan and private Catholic school data are combined.
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that the average high allegation diocese experienced a negative effect of 3.2
percent on ninth grade enrollment, about one third of the one measured for
diocesan schools. The estimate again is not statistically significant. However,
with this caveat, the chapter finds that in high allegation dioceses Catholic
private schools fare relatively better than their diocesan counterparts.
1.5.3 Other Religious and Nonsectarian Schools
What naturally follows is to investigate whether the scandal has an
impact on other private schools. I consider both other religiously affiliated
schools and those that have no proper affiliation and considered secular. An
effect seems plausible if parents of students that attend Catholic schools in
high allegation dioceses want their children to continue their education at a
private institution not affiliated with the sex abuse scandal.
Column 3 of Table 1.5 presents the estimates for the non-Catholic re-
ligiously affiliated schools. In Panel A, the negative effect on first grade en-
rollment is almost 5.4 percent and statistically significant. Both diocesan and
religiously affiliated schools suffered declines in elementary enrollment. The
effect on religiously affiliated schools is about 80 percent of the diocesan es-
timate. For nonsectarian schools, the estimate in the fourth column is not
statistically significant and translates to about a 0.1 percent decrease in first
grade enrollment. Then Panel B of Table 1.5 provides further evidence that
the scandal affected non-Catholic private schools differently. Although the
estimate is not statistically significant, secular schools experienced a 0.8 per-
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cent increase in ninth grade enrollment. Religiously affiliated and nonsectarian
schools respectively have 5.9 and 10.4 percentage point differences in the effect
on ninth grade enrollment when compared to their diocesan counterparts.
Figure 1.9 provides a plot of the estimates of the regressions from a
modified Equation 1.1 on the different log grade level enrollments for diocesan,
private Catholic, other religiously affiliated, and nonsectarian schools. In Panel
A, the absolute value of the magnitude of the effect of the scandal on parochial
school enrollment is largest at the first grade. We visually see that the effect
weakens and goes to zero as we look at the later years in parochial school. A
natural point for changing schools in the Catholic school system occurs in the
ninth grade after a student graduates from a parochial school. The plots show
that for each grade level of high school, diocesan school suffered declines in
enrollment.
In Panel B, the point estimates are positive but not statistically signif-
icant for private Catholic elementary schools. For other religiously affiliated
schools, the pattern of the estimates in Panel C for the early grade levels fol-
lows a similar pattern to that of diocesan schools. However, there appears to
be no effect on grade level enrollment for eighth grade and above. Interestingly,
in Panel D, for nonsectarian schools, there is little to no effect of the scan-
dal on grade level enrollment for grades that are at the parochial level. Yet,
there is visual evidence of a positive effect and a clear difference from that on
diocesan schools for grades at the secondary school level. Overall, the scandal
had strong negative effects on diocesan Catholic schools, and there is mixed
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evidence of the effect on non-diocesan Catholic and other private schools.
1.6 Conclusion
This study has explored how the faith crisis resulting from the 2002
abuse scandal affected Catholics’ attachment to the religion and subsequently
other human capital outcomes, like education. Exploiting the variation of the
exposure of the scandal at the diocesan level, I use a difference-in-differences
specification to estimate the causal impact of the scandal on religious partici-
pation. First, there generally is a decline in the demand for religion as people
disconnect from their local parish and fewer parents initiate their children in
the faith. There is a 7.1 percent drop in the Catholic population. Second,
while, in general, Catholic schools hurt, the demand for diocesan controlled
elementary and high schools experiences a steeper decline. About 180,000 stu-
dents leave diocesan schools, and these departures represent nearly 60 percent
of the decline in enrollment in all private schools since 2000.
One of the key results is that the demand for religious participation
drops, and this potentially informs us of the potential effects of the current
turmoil of the abuse scandal within the Church. Due to the recent revelation of
past allegations in the 2018 Pennsylvania grand jury report coupled with new
allegations against key leaders, many have expressed their displeasure with the
governance of the Church. In response to this pressure, many dioceses began
releasing lists of priests that have had credible accusations leveled against
them. However, it was not a universal practice, and there are still a number
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of them that have not released any such list. This chapter has argued that
the lagged effects of the 2002 scandal were primarily due to one’s hesitance to
change one’s beliefs until a sufficient accumulation of allegations was reached.
Without full transparency, partially disclosing the names of previously accused
but publicly unknown clerics might show a similar pattern in the decline in
the demand for religion.17
More significantly, the results of this chapter demonstrate that a per-
son’s faith experience has ramifications for broader human capital outcomes.
During this crisis of faith, when religious attachment falls, there is a corre-
sponding drop in the number of parents choosing to educate their children in
the diocesan school system. This decrease in demand for Catholic education
should lead one to consider what effects this will have on human capital accu-
mulation. Catholic schools historically have educated those in need and have
a sound reputation in providing a solid education across all groups of students.
Forgoing Catholic education might have long term effects on a person’s labor
outcomes. The starkness of these outcomes leads one to wonder whether there
other aspects of a person’s life were affected by the scandal. The next chapter
delves into this question investigating the consequences to long term health.
17This chapter clearly studied the effect of negative publicity resulting from public reve-
lation of an accused cleric. Entangled with this is that with each newly accused cleric, there
was a growing awareness that the local diocese had not been fully transparent about their
knowledge of past allegations.
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1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Note: This figure plots the total number of first-time allegations of Catholic bishops,
priests, brothers, nuns, and seminarians by year for 1991 to 2018. The first spike occurs in
2002 due to the wave of people coming forward after the investigative reporting of The











































































































































































































































































































































1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
High Allegation Dioceses
Low Allegation Dioceses
Note: This figure shows the average cumulative number of first-time allegations of
Catholic bishops, priests, brothers, nuns, and seminarians by year and high allegation
(dashed line) and low allegation (solid line) dioceses beginning in 1991 to 2016. The solid
vertical line is immediately before 2002 when news of the abuse scandal first broke



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Population
Percentage
Note: This figure shows key metrics of the US Catholic population from 1980-2017 for the
176 geographical Latin Rite dioceses. The solid line plots the US Catholic population (left
axis). The dot-dash line plots the percent (right axis) of the US population that is
Catholic. The solid vertical line is immediately before 2002 when the abuse scandal first
broke nationally. Data comes from the OCD. While the number of Catholics generally
increases throughout the time period, the percentage drops immediately after the 2002











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.1: Averages of Key Church Variables by High and Low





No. of Dioceses 50 126
No. of Allegations 0.50 0.11
No. of Baptisms 10,665 3,433
No. of First Communions 8,945 3,181
No. of Confirmations 6,335 2,251
No. of Elementary Schools 71.6 23.6
No. of Elementary Students 22,050 6,327
No. of High Schools 7.02 3.44
No. of HS Students 4,001 1,533
No. of Parish Churches 162.7 82.4
Catholic Population 713,630 212,644
Total Population 2,374,070 1,286,634
Note: The table shows the means of key participation variables in 2001, one
year before the abuse scandal. The school and enrollment statistics are for
Catholic diocesan schools. All high allegation dioceses had observations for
the listed outcomes with the exception of the Boston and St. Louis for First
Communion. Fourteen low allegation dioceses did not have a high school and
one did not have an elementary school. Allegation data comes from Bishop


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Effect of High Allegations on Diocesan Schools
Log Number of Schools Log Student Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Elementary Schools
Treat × Post -0.1394*** -0.1415*** -0.1421*** -0.1418***
(0.0327) (0.0322) (0.0362) (0.0361)
Mean
Dep. Var. 71.6 22,050
Controls X X
No. of obs. 4,539 4,539 4,541 4,541
B. High Schools
Treat × Post -0.1868*** -0.1644*** -0.2047*** -0.1871***
(0.0444) (0.0380) (0.0611) (0.0564)
Mean
Dep. Var. 7.02 4,002
Controls X X
No. of obs. 4,108 4,108 4,109 4,109
Note: Diocesan and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the diocesan level. Diocesan controls include percentage of diocesan
population that is Hispanic and per capita income. Pre-scandal (2001) means
of the dependant variables from high allegation dioceses are in italics. *** p
<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Log First Grade Enrollment
Treat × Post -0.0697*** 0.0074 -0.0556** -0.0010
(0.0201) (0.0470) (0.0274) (0.0400)
Mean
Dep. Var. 34.20 27.62 18.00 18.04
No. of obs. 227,260 227,260 227,260 227,260
B. Log Ninth Grade Enrollment
Treat × Post -0.0988*** -0.0330 -0.0381 0.0084
(0.0240) (0.0399) (0.0244) (0.0335)
Mean
Dep. Var. 147.15 143.67 22.18 29.42
No. of obs. 94,891 94,891 94,891 94,891
Note: Data comes from the biennial PSUS from the NCES for the years 1990-2016.
School and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the
diocesan level. County controls include percentage of population that is Hispanic,
percentage of population that is school aged, and per capita income. Pre-scandal
(2001) means of the dependant variables from high allegation dioceses are in italics.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table 1.6: Effect of High Allegations on Catholic Schools
Log Number of Schools Log Student Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Elementary Schools
Treat × Post -0.1237*** -0.1272*** -0.1305*** -0.1306***
(0.0325) (0.0321) (0.0358) (0.0358)
Mean
Dep. Var. 74.7 22,870
Controls X X
No. of obs. 4,561 4,561 4,562 4,562
B. High Schools
Treat × Post -0.0737** -0.0615** -0.0432 -0.0360
(0.0298) (0.0380) (0.0288) (0.0342)
Mean
Dep. Var. 13.74 7,988
Controls X X
No. of obs. 4,307 4,307 4,306 4,306
Note: Diocesan and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the diocesan level. Diocesan controls include percentage of diocesan
population that is Hispanic and per capita income. Pre-scandal (2001) means
of the dependant variables from high allegation dioceses are in italics. *** p
<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Chapter 2
Beyond the Pews: The Impact of Abuse
Allegations on Health
2.1 Introduction
We learned from the study in Chapter 1, the sex abuse scandal in the
Catholic Church led to a reduction in religious participation and possibly hu-
man capital as parents moved their children from diocesan schools. These
findings are not surprising as one could easily imagine people’s negative reac-
tion to the institution that was responsible for such scandal. The effects of the
scandal could easily go beyond these two outcomes because a person’s religious
identity goes beyond certain religious tenets. Faith can form the whole person,
shape how one thinks, and partly comprise one’s culture.
This chapter expands on the investigation conducted in the previous
chapter. I study how the scandal’s impact goes beyond religious institutions.
In particular, how do abuse allegations affect the faithful’s health? I study
the effects on how the negative news of the scandal might lead people to risky
behaviors through specifically measuring the outcome of fatalities related to
despair. As discussed earlier in the dissertation, this crisis of faith moves peo-
ple to respond in ways that would decrease the demand for religion and affect
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human capital outcomes.1 I now posit that the exploitation of minors and a
violation of the people’s trust cut off a lifeline where people had social, emo-
tional, and psychological support. In particular, those who availed themselves
of a priest’s counsel left the faith and no longer had that outlet to help pro-
cess the challenges in their life. Abandoning this support structure could lead
individuals to despair.
The econometric strategy to investigate how this crisis of faith affected
the health of of the faithful is very similar to the one in Chapter 1. I exploit
the variation in the exposure of the scandal, as measured by the number of
public allegations, across dioceses, i.e., church juridical regions, in a difference-
in-differences framework. I compare counties that lie in the upper quartile of
dioceses with a high number of allegations in 2002 to all other counties. To do
this, I obtain allegation information from the nonprofit Bishop Accountability,
and I utilize mortality rate data from the CDC Wonder Database.
This chapter finds that with a decline in formal religious connection,
the scandal leads to increases in the incidence of higher mortality rates for sui-
cides, overdoes, and alcohol related liver disease for adults aged 45 to 64. For
men aged 55 to 64, the 1.8 percentage point effect for suicides represents 9.9
percent of the increase of the number of counties that have a suicide mortality
rate greater than 10 per 100,000. Similarly, the 1.2 percentage point increase
for accidental overdoses is 6.4 percent of the increase of the number of counties
1See Section 1.5.1 for a discussion how the scandal might lead parents to pull their
children from religious education and Catholic schools.
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with a high overdose mortality rate. Counties in high allegation diocese also
witness 2.0 percentage point increase in deaths from alcohol related liver dis-
ease. These results are robust to controlling for demographic characteristics,
employment rates, and opioid shipments.
This chapter adds to the larger literature on the economics of religion.
In particular, the failures of the institution of the Catholic Church led people
astray, and I show that this change in the faith experience of Catholics is
linked to larger issues affecting human capital outcomes like health. This is in
a similar vein to Clingingsmith, Khwaja and Kremer (2009) which shows that
the Hajj can be life changing for those who make the pilgrimage. Along the
same lines, papers have shown other ways that religious institutions affect not
only the demand for religion but also the well-being of people. For instance,
religious leaders can influence followers behavior (Bassi and Rasul, 2017), and
missionary work has long lasting, i.e., multigenerational, impacts on human
capital ((Valencia Caicedo, 2018); (Calvi, Hoehn-Velasco and Mantovanelli,
2020)).
This chapter contributes to an existing literature studying the impacts
of the scandal. Studies have shown that the scandal negatively impacted re-
ligious giving, religious employment, and Catholic education ((Hungerman,
2013); (Bottan and Perez-Truglia, 2015); (Dills and Hernández-Julián, 2012)).
The link between religiosity and state welfare has also been examined (Dills
and Hernández-Julián, 2014). This work complements these studies by adding
the human capital dimension of health. This project is the first to show that
52
the scandal pervades beyond the church by affecting mortality rates of behav-
ioral diseases related to despair.
2.2 Background
From my previous findings, a Catholic in a high allegation diocese was
more likely to sever one’s relationship to their church due to the sex abuse
scandal. Evidence has been presented on the negative effect of this crisis on
religious participation in Chapter 1. For a discussion on the events that led to
the flood of allegations from the investigative reporting of The Boston Globe
and on the background of the Catholic Church in the United States, refer
to Section 1.2. I now transition to look at how the scandal might lead to
behavioral changes that may lead to increasing occurrences of certain diseases
related to despair.
Literature in psychology has identified a relationship between religion,
depression, and suicide. Those who are highly religious are less likely to be
depressed and less likely to attempt suicide (Koenig (2012); Van Praag (2009)).
With a decline in religiosity, I conjecture that diseases related to despair might
increase due to a couple of mechanisms.
One reason is when a Catholic is having personal difficulties, he or she
has the option to see a priest or another minister for spiritual conversation or
pastoral care.2 Those who leave the faith and experience such said challenges
2Another avenue in which Catholics receive confidential pastoral care is through the
sacrament of Reconciliation, commonly referred to as confession.
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more than likely no longer avail themselves of that counseling. As a result
the disaffected may never get the help that they desire and need. Another
rationale is, for many people, faith is more than just a set of personal beliefs;
it is an identity. They may question how an institution culturally ingrained
in them could betray them by allowing such atrocities. If people are jarred by
the scandal, this could lead to some having existential crisis. Finally, when a
person leaves a religion, one also leaves his or her local parish community. The
friends and acquaintances that had been a support are no longer as present
nor as practically accessible to the person. As a result, one may struggle to
find other social circles, and this potentially might lead to isolation. In an
attempt to measure despair, the chapter investigates the effect of the scandal
on mortality rates related accidental overdoses, suicides, and alcoholic liver
disease.
2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Data
The main identification strategy utilizes information gleaned from the
non-profit Bishop Accountability. This study makes use of the same data
set, as in Chapter 1, that lists each of the accused priest by diocese with the
year that an allegation was initially made public. From this, I tally by year
and by diocese the number of first-time allegations independent of when the
alleged abuse actually occurred. I continue to use more than five first-time
allegations in 2002 as the threshold to determine which dioceses are treated.
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Using a diocese to county crosswalk, I am then identify counties that lie in
high allegation dioceses and also consider them treated.
For the analysis of the effect on mortality rates, I retrieve county level
death data from the publicly available compressed mortality data set through
the CDC Wonder online database for the years 1991-2014. In particular, I
utilize county level data on the number of deaths by year, gender, age group,
and cause. I follow Case and Deaton (2017) to categorize underlying causes
of death into accidental drug and alcohol overdose, suicide, and liver disease
according to the International Classification of Diseases 9th Edition (ICD9)
for the years 1991-1998 and the International Classification of Diseases 10th
Edition (ICD10) for the years 1999-2014. One of the constraints working with
the publicly available county level data is data suppression. If the number of
deaths for any specific group is less than ten then the number of deaths is
suppressed.3
Intercensal demographic county level data, including race and age,
comes from the US Census Bureau. Additionally, county level data on personal
income comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
3For instance, if the number of heart disease related deaths for women, aged 35 to 44,




Since intensity of the sexual abuse scandal varied across different dio-
ceses within the Church, I exploit that variation in a difference-in-differences
framework. In order to measure the intensity of variation, I count the number
of allegations as mentioned in Chapter 1. I slightly modify my identification
strategy to consider counties as high allegation if they lie in a treated diocese.
As I have shown that the number of allegations vary across dioceses, this chap-
ter tests whether or not a diocese which had greater exposure to the scandal
is related to the mortality rates of deaths of despair.
The estimating equation to estimate the causal impact of the scandal
on the outcomes of interest follow:
Yct = β0 + β1Treatc × Postt + β2Xct + ηc + νt + εct (2.1)
Y is the county level outcome for county c in year t, which particulars are
discussed in the paragraph below. Treatc, an indicator variable, is 1 if the
county c was in a high allegation diocese in 2002. Postt, the other indicator
variable, is 1 if the year t is 2002 or later. β1 is the coefficient of interest
that will give the differential effect of having a experienced a higher volume
of allegations in the county on the chosen outcome. Xct is a vector of county
level specific characteristics, such as Hispanic percentage, per capita income,
manufacturing employment, and unemployment rate. ηc is the difference in
outcome due to diocesan effect, νt represents the common shocks to all dioceses
for a specific year, and ε is the error term.
56
A reasonable choice for the outcome variable Yct is the county level
mortality rate for a particular underlying cause, i.e. the number of deaths per
100,000 people. However, as mentioned the data section, data suppression does
not allow for an accurate estimate of the effect on the rate. Instead, I create
a new dummy variable, Y nct , that is one if the mortality rate is greater than or
equal to n. In other words, the outcome is whether a county’s mortality rate
reaches a certain threshold n.4
The event study for the various outcomes of interest comes from mod-
ifying equation 2.1:
Ydt = β0 +
∑
T 6=2001
[β1TTreatc × 1(t = T )] + β2Xct + ηc + νt + εct (2.2)
The treatment variable Treatc is interacted with a set of indicators, 1(t = T ),
for each calendar year. As such, the yearly coefficients of interest are the β1T s.
I normalize β1,2001 to zero, so all coefficients are interpreted as changes relative
to the year before the news of the scandal broke. The rest follows as above.
2.4 Results: Mortality Rates for Deaths of Despair
Following Case and Deaton (2017)’s categorization of behavior-related
conditions related to despair, I analyze the effect of high allegations on the
subgroups of men and women, aged 45 to 64.5 Due to the limitations of the
4As this cutoff may seem arbitrary, I am in process of getting the restricted data in order
to address this truncation problem. Until then, one of the robustness checks varies the rate,
n.
5I present in full the subgroup of men, aged 55 to 64 because the results are most
comprehensive across the different underlying causes of deaths.
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public data, I estimate the effect of high allegations on the incidence of a
county having a mortality rate greater than 10 deaths per 100,000 people for
each subgroup. Table 2.1 has key mortality statistics for counties by whether
they are in high allegation and low allegation dioceses for the specific subgroup
of men aged 55 to 64. Similar to the summary statistics presented in Table 1.1,
one finds that a county that lies in a treated diocese has a larger population
on average than one that does not; however, the overall group mortality rate is
similar across the two types of counties. Understanding that economic despair
may be one of the drivers for these outcomes, I control for migration, income,
unemployment and manufacturing employment.
Another concern rises when considering drug overdose mortality rates.
One might posit that the timing of the scandal occurs around the beginning
of the opioid crisis in the US. In order to see that this chapter’s identification
strategy differs from the geographic variation of the opioid crisis, I employ data
at the 3-digit zip code level on the annual shipment levels of the most popularly
prescribed opioids, oxycodone and hydrocodone, from the Automated Reports
and Consolidating System of the DEA. Figure 2.1 presents maps noting the
quartiles of annual shipment of these opioids. I note the geographical variation
of these shipments differs from the scandal variation shown in the map of figure
1.2. In particular, areas of high annual shipments are in the southern states
while very few high allegation dioceses are located there.
Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 display the plots of the coefficients for the event
studies for the underlying causes:(1) suicide, (2) accidental drug overdose and
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alcohol poisoning, and (3) alcoholic liver disease and cirrhosis. Each plot gives
evidence of parallel pre-trends, and there is a clear increase in the effect after
news of the abuse scandal broke. With both suicides and accidental overdoses,
there is a statistically significant effect within four years of the news breaking
of the scandal. There is a longer delay to see the effect in liver disease and
cirrhosis. It takes twice as long for a discernible effect. According to the Merck
Manual, alcoholic liver disease is more likely to occur in individuals who are
chronic drinkers for at least eight years. These diseases take a much longer
time to develop, and this could explain the delay of seeing the effect in the
coefficient plot. These findings generally hold if we increase the threshold of
the mortality rate to 20 or 30 deaths for 100,000. Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7
display the event study plots for these larger cutoffs. In each, the shape of the
plot remains relatively the same although the effects take a few years longer
to be statistically significant.
Column 3 of Table 2.2 presents the estimates of the causal impact that
the scandal had on the incidence of a county having a high mortality rate
for men, aged 55 to 64.6 The three different panels provide the estimates
for the underlying causes discussed above. Panel A shows that a county in a
high allegation diocese had about a 1.2 percentage point increase of having a
overdose related mortality rate greater than or equal to 10 per 100,000. This
represents about 6.4 percent of the increase in the number of counties that
6Results for both male and female, aged 45 to 54 are also located in the first two columns
for reference.
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reached this threshold during the period of analysis. There are increases of 1.8
and 2.0 percentage points in the incidences of a treated county having a high
mortality rate for suicide and liver disease related deaths which respectively
represent 9.9 percent and 8.1 percent of the total increase in the number of
counties having this mortality rate threshold. The estimated effects on female
mortality rates are presented in Columns 2 and 4. The effects are smaller
than the estimates for males for each of the causes.7 To put this in context,
I refer to literature on natural disasters. Although there have been mixed
results, Kõlves, Kõlves and De Leo (2013) review several non causal studies
which correlate natural disasters with suicide rates. There are many that have
shown increases. On the upper end of the list, the suicide rate of middle aged
men in areas which have experienced earthquakes rises by about 45 percent
in Taiwan. While the chapter measures the effect on the incidence of high
mortality rate rather than on the actual mortality, the estimated effects fall in
line with this literature. This chapter concludes that the scandal leads to an
increase in the incidence of high mortality rates related to despair for middle
aged men.
7A concern is that the counties in which register 10 or more deaths in a single category
are larger counties. Table 2.3 provides estimates when observations are restricted to counties
who lie in the top half of the total population distribution. Results are qualitatively similar
to those of the main specification.
60
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter along with Chapter 1 has explored how the faith crisis
resulting from the 2002 abuse scandal affected Catholics’ attachment to the
religion and subsequently other human capital outcomes, like education and
long term health outcome. Exploiting the variation of the exposure of the
scandal at the diocesan level, I use a difference-in-differences specification to
estimate the causal impact of the scandal on mortality rates.
This study finds that the effects of the scandal extend beyond religious
institutions. Counties that had more exposure to scandal had a increased
incidence of high mortality rates for accidental overdoses, suicides, and alcohol
related liver disease. The scandal explains respectively 6.4 percent, 9.9 percent,
and 8.0 percent of the increases in the number of counties that experienced high
mortality rates. One of this chapter’s limitations is that it can only measure
the incidence of high mortality rates due to data censoring. This motivates
future study with restricted data from the CDC to do more comprehensive
analysis.
Yet, these consequences to long term health imply that detachment
from faith increases the likelihood of deaths related behavioral related diseases
associated with despair. As such, these findings argue that the effects of shocks
to one’s faith experience are not limited to a church building or even to the
larger religious institution. Additional future research should consider how
religion reaches beyond its own sphere and to take into account people’s faith




Figure 2.1: US Roman Catholic Dioceses by Annual Shipment
Levels of Select Opioids in 2002
Annual Shipment of Oxycodone






Note: The top panel presents the annual shipment level of oxycodone as reported to the
DEA in 2002, and the bottom maps is of the annual shipment level of hydrocodone by US
dioceses. It is clear to note that the geographical variation of the shipment level of these
controlled substances differ from the paper’s identification of high and low allegation
dioceses in Figure 1.2. Data is from the ARCOS at the DEA for the year 2002.
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Figure 2.2: Effect of High Allegations on Incidence of Mortality












1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Suicide
Note: This is the plot of the yearly coefficients for whether a county’s mortality rate for
deaths from suicide is greater than 10 per 100,000 from the analogous county level
specification of equation 1.2. The solid vertical line is immediately before 2002 when the
abuse scandal first broke nationally. The capped vertical bars show 95% confidence
intervals from standard errors clustered at the diocesan level. These plots provide evidence
that the assumption of parallel pre-trends holds and that there is a difference in how the
two types of dioceses evolved after the scandal.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of High Allegations on Incidence of Mortality













1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Drug Overdose and Alcohol Poisoning
Note: This is the plot of the yearly coefficients for whether a county’s mortality rate for
deaths related accidental drug overdose and alcohol poisoning is greater than 10 per
100,000 from the analogous county level specification of equation 1.2. The solid vertical
line is immediately before 2002 when the abuse scandal first broke nationally. The capped
vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the diocesan
level. These plots provide evidence that the assumption of parallel pre-trends holds and
that there is a difference in how the two types of dioceses evolved after the scandal.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of High Allegations on Incidence of Mortality







1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Alcoholic Liver Disease and Cirrhosis
Note: This is the plot of the yearly coefficients for whether a county’s mortality rate for
deaths related to alcoholic liver disease and cirrhosis is greater than 10 per 100,000 from
the analogous county level specification of equation 1.2. The solid vertical line is
immediately before 2002 when the abuse scandal first broke nationally. The capped
vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the diocesan
level. These plots provide evidence that the assumption of parallel pre-trends holds and
that there is a difference in how the two types of dioceses evolved after the scandal.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of High Allegations on the Incidence of











1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Rate >= 20 per 100,000
Rate >= 30 per 100,000
Suicide
Note: These coefficient plots are for the mortality rate for suicide. The blue square is the
coefficient plot for whether a respective underlying cause’s mortality rate is greater than or
equal to 20 deaths per 100,000. The red triangles are for the threshold of 30 deaths per
100,000. 95% confidence intervals are included. The solid vertical line is immediately
before 2002 when the abuse scandal first broke nationally. We see that the general pattern
holds from when we used the baseline threshold of 10 deaths per 100,000 as presented in
Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.6: Effect of High Allegations on the Incidence of













1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Rate >= 20 per 100,000
Rate >= 30 per 100,000
Drug Overdose and Alcohol Poisoning
Note: These coefficient plots are for the mortality rate for accidental drug overdose and
alcohol poisoning. The blue square is the coefficient plot for whether a respective
underlying cause’s mortality rate is greater than or equal to 20 deaths per 100,000. The
red triangles are for the threshold of 30 deaths per 100,000. 95% confidence intervals are
included. The solid vertical line is immediately before 2002 when the abuse scandal first
broke nationally. We see that the general pattern holds from when we used the baseline
threshold of 10 deaths per 100,000 as presented in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of High Allegations on the Incidence of Mortality







1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Rate >= 20 per 100,000
Rate >= 30 per 100,000
Alcoholic Liver Disease and Cirrhosis
Note: These coefficient plots are for the mortality rate for alcoholic liver disease and
cirrhosis. The blue square is the coefficient plot for whether a respective underlying
cause’s mortality rate is greater than or equal to 20 deaths per 100,000. The red triangles
are for the threshold of 30 deaths per 100,000. 95% confidence intervals are included. The
solid vertical line is immediately before 2002 when the abuse scandal first broke nationally.
We see that the general pattern holds from when we used the baseline threshold of 10
deaths per 100,000 as presented in Figure 2.4.
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Table 2.1: Key County Level Mortality Statistics for Men, aged 55





No. of Counties 549 2,370
Average Group Population 10,364 4,088
Average Total Population 217,335 69,334
Average Group Overall Mortality Rate 1,193 1,429
Number of Counties with Group Mortality Rates ≥ 10 per 100,000
Suicide 17 14
Accidental Overdose 5 0
Liver Related 38 38
Note: The table shows key county level mortality statistics for the demo-
graphic group of men, aged 55 to 64, in 2001, one year before the abuse
scandal. There is data for 2,919 out of 3,141 counties in the United States.
All data comes from the compressed mortality files from the CDC Wonder
database.
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Table 2.2: Effect of High Allegations on Incidence of Counties with
Mortality Rate ≥10 per 100,000
Aged 45-54 Aged 55-64
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Accidental Overdose
Treat × Post 0.0412*** 0.0239** 0.0117* 0.0072
(0.0138) (0.0103) (0.0069) (0.0045)
No. of obs. 65,524 65,524 65,524 65,524
B. Suicide
Treat × Post 0.0281*** 0.0050* 0.0175** 0.0008
(0.0081) (0.0029) (0.0071) (0.0018)
No. of obs. 65,524 65,524 65,524 65,524
C. Alcoholic Liver Disease
Treat × Post 0.0090 0.0023 0.0200** -0.0005
(0.0063) (0.0042) (0.0082) (0.0035)
No. of obs. 65,524 65,524 65,524 65,524
Note: The outcome variables are indicators whether a county experienced a
mortality rate greater than 10 per 100,000 for each of the individual death
categories. Data comes from the CDC Wonder database for the years 1991-
2015. County and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered
at the diocesan level. County controls include percentage of population that is
Hispanic, per capita income, manufacturing employment, and unemployment
rate. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table 2.3: Effect of High Allegations on Incidence of Counties with
Mortality Rate ≥10 per 100,000 Large Counties
Aged 45-54 Aged 55-64
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Accidental Overdose
Treat × Post 0.0407*** 0.0258** 0.0121 0.0086
(0.0151) (0.0124) (0.0084) (0.0057)
No. of obs. 34,192 34,192 34,192 34,192
B. Suicide
Treat × Post 0.0265** 0.0054 0.0162* 0.0003
(0.0090) (0.0038) (0.0083) (0.0024)
No. of obs. 34,192 34,192 34,192 34,192
C. Alcoholic Liver Disease
Treat × Post 0.0058 0.0013 0.0165* -0.0019
(0.0081) (0.0057) (0.0099) (0.0049)
No. of obs. 34,192 34,192 34,192 34,192
Note: The outcome variables are indicators whether a county experienced a
mortality rate greater than 10 per 100,000 for each of the individual death cat-
egories. Data comes from the CDC Wonder database for the years 1991-2015.
Only the upper half of counties in population are included in the regressions.
County and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at
the diocesan level. County controls include percentage of population that is
Hispanic, per capita income, manufacturing employment, and unemployment
rate. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Chapter 3




The production of clean energy has expanded considerably in the United
States over the past two decades. A major source is wind energy. Beyond pro-
viding clean energy to the electric grid, wind farms bring in new jobs and
increased tax revenue to rural communities.1 Yet, recent studies have shown
there are hidden costs to wind farms, such as noise.
Noise pollution – defined as any unwanted or disturbing sound that
affects health and well-being – is ubiquitous and affects millions of people
each day. As early as 1968 and as recent as 2019, noise has been described as
a public health crisis. Many studies have found that noise negatively impacts
human health and cognition,2 and there is evidence that this is a channel
by which noise can impair educational outcomes of students. We believe it
is critical to gain a better understanding of the impact of noise pollution on
students’ educational outcomes, health, and behavior, and this research will
be one of the first to measure the magnitude of these effects.
1Douglas (2019) reports that even after installations there will be room for business
growth. As technical jobs will be needed to maintain wind turbines, this may lure people
to move to areas to provide this skill.
2Negative effects of noise on human health and cognition have been widely documented
and discussed in popular media (Bosker (2019); Bosker, Hassenfeld and Katz (2019); Owen
(2019)). In response to noise exposure, the body releases stress hormones, causing increases
in blood pressure and heart rate. Research has linked noise exposure with adverse effects
such as stress, fatigue, poor concentration, reduced sleep quality, and productivity loss in
the workplace. Repeated exposure to noise has been associated with more serious outcomes
such as high blood pressure, heart disease, diabetes, dementia, and depression. While loud
noises above 85 dB are of particular concern, low levels of noise also have negative effects
on health and cognition. For example, people respond to noises as low as 33 dB, roughly
between the volume levels of whispers and suburban areas at night, which can cause sleep
disruption and reduce memory reprocessing during sleep.
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This chapter studies the impact of noise from wind turbines on student
achievement, namely by examining how Texas public school students do on
standardized tests. Wind is a rapidly increasing source of renewable electrical
energy in the United States, nearly tripling in electrical output from 2010
through 2018,3 and wind turbine construction has increased in many states
over that period. Despite its role as a cost-efficient source of clean energy,
wind turbines have been reported to produce low-frequency noise pollution and
cause adverse health effects in people living in the vicinity of wind turbines, a
phenomenon known as “Wind Turbine Syndrome.”4 The U.S. Department of
Energy notes that wind turbines can produce noise from generator hum and
blade rotation, and that at distances greater than 400 meters from a wind
turbine, these noise levels are “typically” 40 dB and below.5 For the first
time in 2018, the World Health Organization included noise pollution from
wind turbines in its Environmental Noise Guidelines for the European Region,
recommending that policymakers take measures to reduce noise pollution from
wind turbines to levels below 45 dB.
Our econometric strategy to investigate how wind turbines affect stu-
dent performance through this channel is to exploit the variation in the timing
of the installation of wind turbines and their locations using a difference-in-
3Wind is the second largest source of renewable energy in the United States (behind
solar energy), producing 2 percent of total electricity generation and 39 percent of electricity
generation from renewable energy in 2018. Electricity generated from wind has nearly tripled
from 95 billion kilowatt-hours in 2010 to 275 billion kilowatt-hours in 2018 (U.S. Energy
Information Administration (2020)).
4Reported symptoms include nausea, sleep disorders, fatigue, and increased stress.
5Sounds as low as 33 dB can cause sleep disruption.
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differences framework. The wind energy industry has exploded in the last few
decades. In 1999, Texas Senate Bill 7 was signed into law that deregulated
the electricity market. Tied to this legislation was a mandate to increase clean
energy production. As such, since then there have been more than 15,000 wind
turbines installed in Texas.
The strategy relies on data from the United States Wind Turbine
Database (USWTDB) which has installation date, the latitude, and the lon-
gitude for each installed wind turbine in the country. We couple this with
publicly available school directory data and standardized test data from the
Texas Education Agency (TEA) to geolocate schools and turbines. With this,
we compare schools that are near wind turbines to schools that lie further
away. While the results qualitatively hold if we increase or decrease the dis-
tance, we ultimately decide to consider schools that are 10 or fewer kilometers
away from a wind turbine.6
Under our preferred specification controlling for school characteristics,
we find that wind turbines decrease reading test scores by 4.6 percent of one
standard deviation. Interestingly, we find no significant effect on overall stu-
dent math performance. Additionally, we discover that certain subgroups of
students experience the greater brunt of this negative effect. The reading
scores of non-minority students drop 8.2 percent of a standard deviation. Ad-
ditionally, on the reading portion of standardized tests, female students do 2.2
6Approximately 5% of the schools in our sample falls within 10 km of a wind turbine.
There will be a further discussion about our distance criterion in the results section.
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percent of standard deviation better than male students.
This study extends this literature to other environmental factors that
can affect human health and productivity. An extensive literature has found
that air pollution has negative effects on human health.7 Other papers have
added to show that air pollution is associated with reductions in worker pro-
ductivity (Graff Zivin and Neidell (2012)). Additionally, we contribute to the
literature that looks at factors in the school environment that affects the edu-
cation production function. Studies have discovered that air pollution leads to
decrease performance on standardized tests (Ebenstein, Lavy and Roth (2016);
Heissel, Persico and Simon (2019); Persico and Venator (2019)).
There is little work in the economics literature that studies noise pollu-
tion, and to our knowledge no prior work has studied the causal effect of noise
pollution on educational outcomes. Other literature has offered suggestive ev-
idence that noise can impact student performance. Bronzaft and McCarthy
(1975) provide suggestive evidence that noise pollution may reduce cognitive
performance and educational outcomes of children.8 We posit that the nega-
7Many papers – such as Chay and Greenstone (2003), Currie and Neidell (2005), and
Currie and Walker (2011) – study the impact of air pollution on health by using infant
health and mortality as an outcome. This choice of an outcome variable is due to difficulties
with measuring adult health; issues include unobservable cumulative lifetime exposure to
air pollution, and the possibility of harvesting effects, where those in poor health are most
affected by air pollution.
8They found, in one New York City public school adjacent to subway tracks, that students
on the side of the school facing the tracks achieved lower scores on a reading achievement
test compared to students on the side facing away from the tracks. In 1978, after New York
City reduced noise from the tracks and installed acoustical installations in the school, the
gap in test scores between the two groups of students disappeared.
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tive effects on health and cognition from exposure to noise are the channel by
which noise pollution impacts educational outcomes.
We add to the growing literature on the effects of wind energy gen-
eration. We complement both Zou (2020)–who finds that both sleeplessness
and suicides rise due to noise pollution resulting from the installation of wind
farms9–and Brunner, Hoen and Hyman (2021)–who find the expansion of wind
energy increases school district revenue but has no impact on academic per-
formance. We shift focus from health to education, use more granular data to
study outcomes on the school level, and also find negative consequences due
to noise pollution.
3.2 Public Schools and Wind Energy in Texas
As the wind energy industry rapidly grew in Texas, it was only a matter
of time before turbines would be installed near a public school. The public
school system is quite vast. More than 5 million students attend one of the
nearly 10,000 public schools in Texas. The vast majority of these schools
fall under the jurisdiction of one of the 1,013 independent school districts.10
Each independent school districts have governance in how their students are
educated with overall supervision from the statewide Texas Education Agency.
9For a detailed discussion on the noise created by wind turbines and the potential health
consequences from low frequency noise, see the Background section of Zou (2020)
10In this chapter, we do not include charter schools or certain state-run schools in our
analysis. We do this in part because these schools can attract students from further distances
than the typical public school.
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School district boundaries are not necessarily tied to any natural, county, or
city borders. For instance, certain districts can overlap cities or counties while
others may lie completely within a county. With few exceptions, students
attend schools in school districts in which they reside. Each school district
also sets attendance boundaries for each of its schools.
Texas has the largest installed wind energy capacity among all states
in the United States. In fact the next closest state, Iowa has less than half
of the of energy capacity. Figure 3.1 displays the time series of the expansion
of wind farms in Texas. The solid line illustrates that the initial capacity
began only at 90 MW in 1999, and, over the next two decades, wind energy
quickly exploded to nearly 30,000 MW.11 In the same figure, the dashed line
shows the number of wind turbines that were installed annually over the same
time period of our study. While there are some years where there were few
installations, there are several years of quite heavy expansion.
Panel A of Figure 3.2 plots the location of the 15,524 wind turbines in
Texas. We see that the majority of the turbines are located in West Texas
to take advantage of natural wind patterns. Wind farms also populate the
southern part of the state. Additionally, we highlight a group of 16 counties
11This rapid expansion occurred in part to the passage of Texas Senate Bill 7 in 1999
which deregulated the electricity market. Tied to this legislation was a mandate for utilities
to invest in renewable energy and increase capacity to 2,000 MW by 2009, doubling the then
US wind energy capacity. Wind energy companies leased and purchased land first in West
Texas to take advantage of the wind patterns. In the spirit of the legislation, there was little
oversight on where wind turbines were installed. For a detailed history of the wind energy
expansion in Texas, see Galbraith and Price (2013).
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to provide a greater depth of analysis. Panel B offers this zoomed in view of
the selection. In this section of the state, there are 326 wind turbines. There
are 51 schools that fall within a 30 km radius of a turbine, including 13 that
lie 10 km or nearer. Public schools located within 10 km to 30 km of a wind
turbine are denoted with blue crosses. Schools that fall quite close to a turbine,
i.e. less than 10 km, are marked with a black x. Although many wind turbines
are located away from large population centers, there are some schools located
nearby them.
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Data
Data on installed wind turbines comes from the United States Wind
Turbine Database (USWTDB). Information about each wind turbine in the
US includes the year it became operational, its capacity in kilowatts, and
its latitude and longitude. Additionally, we get school directory information,
including site street address, from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) for
all public schools in Texas. With the aid of the Texas A&M Geoservices,
we obtain the latitude and longitude for each school. Using this information
we geocode each wind turbine to every Texas public school that lies within a
certain distance. We then create a panel dataset that has annual data on the
number of installed turbines with their total energy capacity that falls near a
school.
We merge this panel dataset on wind turbine capacity at the school
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level with student achievement data. In particular, we use publicly available
data from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) for standardized tests scores on
the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) and State of Texas As-
sessments of Academic Readiness (STAAR) exams. We obtain average reading
and math scores along with associated demographic data for each public school
campus for the school years 2002-2003 to 2018-2019. We then standardize all
test scores to mean zero and standard deviation one within subject, grade,
year. One of our limitations is that we do not have student level data, and
this makes it difficult to test certain aspects of the robustness of our results.12
This work focuses on schools that lie within 10 km radius of wind
turbine. We chose this for a few primary reasons. First, Zou (2020) studies and
find effects on both sleeplessness and suicide rates for individuals who reside
within 25 km of a wind farm. Second, according to this same study, noises at
low frequency persist longer. For instance, low frequency noise is attenuated
by 20 dB relative to the source 20 km away. Zou posits that although low
frequency noise may be inaudible, it may still stimulate a biological response.
As such, studies should be conducted about the possible consequences from
exposure to these sounds. Finally, as we further discuss in the results section,
the effects hold when we either contract or expand the threshold of what
constitutes a near school. The 10 km radius is in the middle of the range of
distances that yield significant results.
12Some of these concerns will be discussed in our Empirical Strategy section.
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Table 3.1 provides summary statistics on observables across schools that
are close to wind turbines to those that are farther away. Column 1 provides
information on the public schools that lie within 10 km of a wind turbine prior
to the installation of the first turbine. Column 2 gives the characteristics for
these schools after the wind turbine has been installed. Column 3 summarizes
the same statistics for all other schools. For the sample in our analysis, we
focus only on public schools that are regular institutions, i.e. not alternative
disciplinary or charter schools. The average z-scores for both reading and math
tests for schools near turbines before installation are similar to the scores
of schools outside the 10 km radius. We see in the periods after turbine
installation, z-scores are lower for close schools; Column 4 relays that the
difference is not statistically significant. There is a notable difference in the
size of the schools due to the fact the schools near turbines are more likely
in rural areas. Demographic characteristics in schools close to turbines are
statistically different than those of other schools. In particular, students are
more likely to be economically disadvantaged and eligible for the National
School Lunch Program. We address this by controlling for these characteristics
in the regression analysis. Interestingly, the fraction of students who are at-
risk for dropping out from school are similar between the two types of schools.




We will estimate the causal effect of noise pollution on educational
outcomes using a difference-in-differences methodology. We posit that there
are two plausible channels through which noise pollution can affect students:
(1) sleep disruption at their homes as Zou (2020) shows and (2) audible noise
during class at school. Our method studies a combination of both channels–
disruption that occurs during the day as well as at night.
Under this scheme, our empirical analysis estimates how noise pollution
occurring in the vicinity of elementary, middle, and high schools during school
hours negatively affects students’ educational outcomes, as measured through
test scores. Using geolocation data of public schools and sources of noise pollu-
tion, we calculate the distance between schools and sources of noise pollution.
Specifically, we identify wind turbines that are near schools. As such, we set
up the treatment variable for our estimating equation, detailed below, as a
binary variable that equals one if the school was within an K-kilometer radius
of a source of noise pollution at a given point in time and zero otherwise. We
decide on a threshold for what constitutes a school being near a turbine by
estimating the treatment effect for different distances.13 There are a variety of
distances for which an effect is detectable, and we use 10 km as a reasonable
choice for our preferred specification.
The chapter estimates the causal impact of noise pollution on outcomes
13In the results section, we detail that the treatment effect dissipates at 30 kilometers.
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of interest using the estimating equation for the preferred specification that
follows:
Ygst = βKPostst ×NearKs +Xstδ + ηg + γs + λt + εst (3.1)
where Ygst is the z-score of the grade g average test score for school s during
year t, βK is the parameter of interest that estimates the causal effect of
noise pollution, Postst indicates periods after a wind turbine installation event,
NearKs indicates whether school s is within K kilometers of a noise pollution
source, Xst is a vector of time-varying school-level covariates, ηg is a grade
level fixed effect, γs is a school fixed effect, λt is a year fixed effect, and εst is
an error term. School-level controls include the fractions of students who are
male, white, Hispanic, economically disadvantaged, and at-risk for dropping
out.





[βTNearKs × 1(th = T )] +Xstδ + ηg + γs + λt + εst,
for h = −5, 4,−3, · · · , 3, 4
(3.2)
The treatment variable NearKs is interacted with a set of indicators, 1(th =
T ), for each calendar year. As such, the yearly coefficients of interest are the
βT s. t0 represents the year of the wind turbine installation. t−1 is omitted,
and I normalize βt−1 to zero. As such, all βT coefficients are interpreted as
changes relative to the year before installation. The rest follows as above.
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The estimates that we derive from our specification are causal under the
following assumption: in the absence of a source of noise pollution, educational
outcomes for students attending schools within K kilometers of a noise source
would have followed the same pre-trend as that of schools that were outside
an K-kilometer radius of a noise sources. Our analysis does yield that both
treated and untreated schools have parallel pre-trends so this assumption seems
credible.
There are possible limitations to our identification strategy. First, it
is possible that the introduction of wind turbines would reduce the region’s
reliance on energy from fossil fuels, which produce air pollution. For instance,
in the areas of new wind farm installations, traditional energy sources, such
as coal plants, may cut back their capacity and/or production. To the extent
that the introduction of wind turbines is associated with a reduction in air pol-
lution, our results underestimate the estimate of the impact of wind turbines
on educational outcomes.
Second, the installation of wind turbines can lead to compositional
changes in the student body of nearby schools. As it seems unlikely that the
installation of wind turbines is unanticipated, families may decide to move
away once they hear the news, possibly because of concerns about the im-
pact on their home’s value or negative health effects. Maybe the introduction
of green energy is displacing workers in the fossil fuel (or other) industries.
Perhaps families with at least one parent working in green energy are moving
in (and maybe these people are better educated, more wealthy, and/or have
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children with greater human capital development); or perhaps people are only
moving out, and the only families that stay in the treated areas are the poorest
and/or least educated. The direction of this bias is ambiguous. Unfortunately,
with the public data, we cannot directly address this last concern but we will
tackle this in a future study with data from the Texas Education Research
Center when we have access to administrative individual level data.
3.4 Academic Achievement Response to Wind Turbines
3.4.1 Distance from Wind Turbines
Our main specification relies on determining a threshold for what con-
stitutes a school being close to to a turbine. In order to come up with plausible
values for the Near variable in Equation 3.1, we estimate using several dif-
ferent values for this treatment variable. A reasonable distance according to
the previous literature hovers around 25 km. As such, we vary the threshold
for the school’s distance from a turbine from 5 km to 30 km. Figure 3.3 plots
the pooled estimates for the effect on reading test scores. Its shows that the
estimates are negative and significant at the smallest distances. At 20 km,
the estimated effect is still significant at the 10 percent level. The pooled ef-
fect nears zero for all schools located with 25 km of a turbine. The estimates
for math scores in Figure 3.4 provide a similar story in how the estimates
dissipate.
For the next part of analysis, we bin groups of schools by how far they
are from wind turbines. In Table 3.2, the six columns each provide the estimate
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for different 5 km-sized bins of nearby schools. In Panel A, the estimates by
bin for reading test scores show unsurprisingly the strongest effect is for the
nearest schools. For the 132 schools that fall in the 0-5 km bin, there is nearly
a 11 percent of a standard deviation decrease in test scores. The estimates
continue to be negative for the bins up to 20 km, but they are not significant.
Finally, the estimates for the furthest bin is close to zero. The estimates of the
effect on math scores in Panel B follow a similar pattern with estimate of the
final grouping at 25-30 km a noisy zero. These findings make it reasonable to
assume that any effects most likely dissipate around 30 km. After previewing
these results, we find that using a base threshold of 10 km seems acceptable
going forward.
3.4.2 Main Results
Figure 3.5 provides the event study plot derived from Equation 3.2
on the effect of wind turbines on student reading and math performance on
state standardized tests. The difference in how the outcomes evolve by the
two groups of schools, i.e. (1) those near wind turbines and (2) all others, is
evident in this coefficient plot. In the five years prior to the installation of the
turbine, the coefficients for the reading z-score regression are close to zero and
not statistically significant. It seems plausible that the assumption of parallel
pre-trends for reading performance holds. In the year of installation, there is
a significant drop of 0.091 standard deviations in scores. This continues in the
following years as the estimates remain negative and statistically significant
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through the first full three years that a school is located within 10 km of a
wind turbine. By the fourth year, the effect curiously tapers off and loses
statistical significance.
Why might this trend occur? Perhaps, the effect dissipates after a
couple of years because schools make efforts to abate the noise by installing
sound proofing. Additionally, it may also happen due to families in their
home life also taking mitigating action. Or, simply, students may learn how
to adapt due to the increased noise. To further investigate this in the future,
we will strive to acquire anecdotal data on whether schools near turbines took
any action to deal with any perceived increases in noise. We also will use
individual level data to see if and how the measured effect changes during a
student’s academic career.
Figure 3.6 provides the event study plot of the effect of wind turbines
on student math scores. It is clear and evident that there is a downward linear
trend prior to the installation of a wind turbine. Because of the pre-trend we
are cautious in the way we interpret the effect. This chapter seems to have
better a experimental design for studying the effect on reading performance
than math performance. Due to this pre-trend, there is a bias to find an
negative effect on the standardized math scores.
The primary results are presented Table 3.3. Panel A reports the esti-
mates of the effect of wind turbines on reading test scores. Column 1 shows
that relative to the years before a wind turbine is installed, scores on the
reading portion of standardized tests drop by a significant 0.046 standard de-
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viations. We include more stringent controls in Column 2 by interacting the
grade fixed effects and the school fixed effects. This yields a quite similar,
statistically significant effect of 0.043 standard deviations. The estimates of
the effect on math performance are in Panel B. The point estimate in Column
1 implies that there is a 2.3 percent of one standard deviation decline in math
scores. Although the estimated effect on math scores has a smaller magnitude
than the one one on reading, the difference between the two is not statistically
significant. As such, we cannot dismiss the notion that wind turbines have a
similar effect on reading and math performance.
We next investigate how wind turbines affect various subgroups of stu-
dents. Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8, and Figure 3.9 respectively plot the event studies
for (1) male and female students, (2) white, black, and Hispanic students, and
(3) gifted and at-risk students. Remarkably, each subgroup has evidence of
parallel pre-trends. Looking at the effect by ethnicity in Figure 3.8, the es-
timated effect on white students (Panel B) is approximately an 8 percent of
one standard deviation decline in test scores while the one on black students
(Panel C) is smaller and not significant. In fact, there is not a clear effect on
black students. The estimates of the effect for Hispanic students (Panel D)
follow the general pattern to those on all students. The effect tapers off by the
fourth year. Interestingly, the coefficients for the effect on white students stay
negative, grow in absolute value, and remain statistically significant through-
out the event horizon. While the event studies for most subgroups investigated
have a similar shape, the estimated effects on white students appears the most
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persistent.14
We discover there are heterogeneous effects when we look at the pooled
estimates for the disaggregated results. In Table 3.4, Column 1 has the es-
timate of the preferred specification for all students. Column 2 presents the
effect on males which is similar to the one for all students. In Panel A, males
experience 5.6 percent of a standard deviation decline in their reading scores.
The estimate for female students in Column 3 is smaller in magnitude and not
significant. Since this exercise is an example of multiple hypothesis testing,
we generate Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) sharpened q-values as
described in Anderson (2008) and provide them in angle brackets in the ta-
ble. With these revisions, both estimates are significant. Additionally, we test
whether the difference on whether the estimated effects on reading scores is
significant in in Column 4. The difference of 2.2 percent is, in fact, significant.
In Panel B, while all the estimates on math scores are negative, neither the
estimates nor the difference between them are statistically significant.
Table 3.5 provides the pooled estimates for white, black, and Hispanic
students. The statistically significant estimate on reading scores for whites,
in Column 2, is quite large at -0.082. This estimate remains statistically
significant even with the sharpened q-value. While both black and Hispanic
students experience a smaller effect on reading scores than white students,
only the difference between black and white students is statistically significant.
14The event study plots for the effect on math performance are included in Appendix B.
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White students on average score 0.062 standard deviations lower than black
students after the installation of a wind turbine. In Panel B, the estimates for
the effect on math scores reveal that white students experience a significant
-0.089 effect. Additionally, Hispanic students do 12 percent of a standard
deviation better than their white counterparts in the post period.
Finally, we examine the differences between gifted students and at-
risk students in Table 3.6. Compared to the overall effect, gifted students
experience a stronger effect of -0.074 on reading scores. When corrected for
multiple hypothesis testing, the estimate’s sharpened q-value falls just outside
the 10% significance level. While not significant, the point estimate of the
effect for at-risk students is slightly positive. Yet, the rather large difference
between the estimated effects of the two groups of students is -0.102 and
statistically significant. In Panel B, the effects on math scores are positive but
not significant. Overall, after looking at the different groups, we find that the
effect of wind turbines on academic outcomes weighs more heavily on three:
male students, white students, and gifted students.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents a quasi-experimental analysis of the impact of
noise pollution from wind turbines on educational outcomes of students attend-
ing elementary schools in Texas. Using aggregated standardized test scores at
the school level and data on geolocations of schools and wind turbines, we use
a difference-in-differences design to study how the introduction of wind tur-
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bines impacted reading and mathematics scores of students attending nearby
schools. While there is no overt counter evidence to the parallel pre-trend as-
sumption for reading scores, there is potential flaw in our experimental design
in investigating math scores. There is a linear pre-trend that positively biases
us to find an effect on math scores.
We find that wind turbines are associated with a 0.046 standard devia-
tion decline in reading scores, but no statistically meaningful change in math
scores. Additionally there are heterogeneous effects among certain subgroups
of students. Reading scores for males are 0.022 standard deviations lower than
those of females. Non-minorities also appear to face the brunt of the effect as
the reading scores for white students drop by 0.082 standard deviations.
We interpret these results as providing evidence of a hidden cost of in-
stalling wind turbines in rural communities: the disruption of human capital
accumulation of children. Yet, we understand the limitations to this current
study. We believe that an improved research design using detailed, individual-
level data on test scores, migration, and health outcomes presents an oppor-
tunity for future work that will allow us to explain the mechanisms behind
this chapter’s results and more credibly study the impact of noise on student
outcomes.
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Turbines
Note: The solid blue line presents the time series of the total installed wind energy
capacity in the state of Texas. The dashed red line presents the annual number of new












































































































































































































































































































































































Distance of Turbine from School
 (Number of Schools)
Note: The figure plots of the coefficients from the different regressions of the estimating
equation 3.1 when the “Near” variable is changed from 5 km to 30 km. The vertical bars
show 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Distance of Turbine from School
 (Number of Schools)
Note: The figure plots of the coefficients resulting from the different regressions of the
estimating equation 3.1 when the “Near” variable is changed from 5 km to 30 km. The
vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the school
level.
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years Relative to Turbine Installation
Note: The figure provides the plot of the yearly coefficients from equation 3.2 with the
z-scores from reading standardized tests. The solid vertical line is immediately before
relative year 0 when the first turbine was installed. The capped vertical bars show 95%
confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the school level. This plot provides
evidence that the assumption of parallel pre-trends holds.
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years Relative to Turbine Installation
Note: The figure provides the plot of the yearly coefficients from equation 3.2 with the
z-scores from math standardized tests. The solid vertical line is immediately before
relative year 0 when the first turbine was installed. The capped vertical bars show 95%
confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the school level. Clearly from this
plot, a linear trend is detected prior to the first turbine installation and the assumption of










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All Others (1) - (3)
Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Students 302 281 382 -80.46***
(315) (243) (344) (17.6)
Math z-score -0.015 -0.073 -0.012 -0.002
(0.767) (1.02) (0.868) (0.026)
Reading z-score 0.045 -0.063 0.030 0.015
(0.771) (1.13) (0.947) (0.029)
Fraction male 0.501 0.508 0.506 -0.005***
(0.033) (0.046) (0.035) (0.001)
Fraction white 0.273 0.270 0.358 -0.085***
(0.304) (0.281) (0.281) (0.022)
Fraction Hispanic 0.685 0.662 0.453 0.232***
(0.330) (0.323) (0.296) (0.025)
Fraction econ. disadvantage 0.660 0.654 0.529 0.131***
(0.285) (0.273) (0.274) (0.023)
Fraction at risk 0.441 0.481 0.421 0.020
(0.184) (0.189) (0.191) (0.013)
Windmills within 10km — 24.9 — —
(39.5)
Number of Schools 338 354 6,809
Note: All statistics are calculated at the school level and includes all school grades.
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Demographic information are from students
who took reading portion of the standardized tests from 2002-2019. Statistics are
weighted by the number of students who took the tests. School data comes from the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Effect of Wind Turbines on Student Achievement
(1) (2)
A. Reading Test Scores
Post × Near -0.046** -0.043*
(0.022) (0.025)
No. of obs. 292,263 291,692
B. Math Test Scores
Post × Near -0.023 -0.039
(0.030) (0.030)




Grade fixed effects X
School fixed effects X
Year fixed effects X X
Grade × School fixed effects X
Note: This includes all regular instructional schools in Texas from 2002-2018.
Test scores are standardized to mean 0 and SD 1. School controls for all
regressions include the fractions of students who are male, white, Hispanic,
economically disadvantaged, and at-risk for dropping out. “Post” indicates
years after wind turbine installation. “Near” indicates schools that are within
10 km of turbines. Regressions are weighted by the number of students who
took the tests. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01,
** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table 3.4: Effect of Wind Turbines on Test Scores by Gender
All Male Female M - F
Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Reading Test Scores
Post × Near -0.046** -0.056** -0.034 -0.022*
(0.22) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013)
p-value [0.037] [0.023] [0.121] [0.0871]
q-value — 〈0.049〉 〈0.065〉 —
No. of obs. 293,263 286,144 285,824 —
B. Math Test Scores
Post × Near -0.023 -0.026 -0.019 -0.007
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.012)
p-value [0.443] [0.382] [0.543] [0.548]
q-value — 〈1.000〉 〈1.000〉 —
No. of obs. 299,617 293,084 292,699 —
Note: This includes all regular instructional schools in Texas from 2002-2018.
Test scores are standardized to mean 0 and SD 1. School controls for all
regressions include the fractions of students who are male, white, Hispanic,
economically disadvantaged, and at-risk for dropping out. Grade, school, and
year fixed effects included. “Post” indicates years after wind turbine installa-
tion. “Near” indicates schools that are within 10 km of turbines. Regressions
are weighted by the number of students who took the tests. Standard errors
are clustered at the school level. P-values are included in square brackets.
Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) sharpened q-values are included in






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Effect of Wind Turbines on Test Scores by Academic
Group
All Gifted At-Risk Gifted -
At-Risk
Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Reading Test Scores
Post × Near -0.046** -0.074** 0.028 -0.102**
(0.22) (0.037) (0.032) (0.049)
p-value [0.037] [0.046] [0.379] [0.037]
q-value — 〈0.101〉 〈0.214〉 —
No. of obs. 293,263 186,661 271,902 —
B. Math Test Scores
Post × Near -0.023 0.012 0.054 -0.042
(0.030) (0.046) (0.036) (0.059)
p-value [0.443] [0.800] [0.138] [0.471]
q-value — 〈0.667〉 〈0.382〉 —
No. of obs. 299,617 293,084 275,933 —
Note: This includes all regular instructional schools in Texas from 2002-2018.
Test scores are standardized to mean 0 and SD 1. School controls for all
regressions include the fractions of students who are male, white, Hispanic,
economically disadvantaged, and at-risk for dropping out. Grade, school, and
year fixed effects included. “Post” indicates years after wind turbine installa-
tion. “Near” indicates schools that are within 10 km of turbines. Regressions
are weighted by the number of students who took the tests. Standard errors
are clustered at the school level. P-values are included in square brackets.
Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) sharpened q-values are included in






A.1 Alternative Thresholds for Treatment
Table A.1 provides the detailed list of the paper’s preferred specification
of treated dioceses with the corresponding number of first-time allegations in
2002. One worry is whether the results rely on the specific threshold for a
treated diocese in order to achieve the results of the paper. Figure A.1 shows
the event study plots for log infant baptism for several different thresholds:
greater than 3, 5, 7, and 9 allegations. Each of the plots follow a similar
pattern to the preferred threshold of this paper, i.e. a high allegation diocese
had more than 5 allegations in 2002. Additionally, Figure A.2 displays the
coefficient plots for the log Catholic population, and a similar conclusion can
be made.
Table A.2 presents the estimates of the effect on the Sacraments of Ini-
tiation with high allegation threshold of more than 3 allegations in the even
columns. Under this new threshold, 73 of the 176 dioceses are treated. The es-
timates from the original specification are in the odd columns. The estimates
from the altered threshold are slightly smaller but qualitatively similar to the
those of the preferred specification. For instance, under this new specification,
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First Communions drop by 6.9 percent as opposed to 7.8 percent. Addition-
ally, Table A.3 similarly has the results for the effect on mortality related to
despair for those aged 55 to 64. Again, there are qualitatively similar results
for each cause of death although the estimates somewhat smaller. The inci-
dence of a high suicide mortality rate rises by 1.2 percentage points under this
specification as opposed to the 1.8 percentage points estimated using the orig-
inal threshold. Overall, the analysis of this paper is robust when the threshold
is changed.
Finally, Table A.4 presents the estimates of the effect on the Sacraments
of Initiation when the measure of the intensity of the scandal is measured in
terms of the per capita number of first-time allegations. Under this measure,
I consider the top 50 dioceses as being treated. The estimates on each par-
ticipation variable increases when compared to the baseline specification. For
instance, infant baptisms drop by 16.3 percent compared to 13.2 percent.
A.2 Alternative Outcome Specification
One concern with this identification of this paper is the specification of
the outcome variables. For the preferred specification, I have used the log of
outcomes. One suggestion is to use per capita measures because that will take
in to account the different sizes of the dioceses which varies substantially.
As such, the paper does this for outcomes per one million people. I find
qualitatively similar results to the preferred specification. Figure A.3 presents
the corresponding plots of the year coefficients for infant baptisms and First
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Communion. Table A.5 presents the pooled estimates for the effect on these
sacraments. We recall that the mean total population for high allegation
dioceses before the scandal was 2.37 million. Then, from columns 2 and 4, the
average high allegation diocese had declines of about 776 infant baptisms and
673 First Communions, which are very close to the previous estimates.
The pattern holds the for diocesan schools. Figures A.4 and A.5 dis-
play the respective coefficient plots for elementary and high schools. In Table
A.6, the estimates in Panel A show that the average high allegation diocese
experienced a loss of nearly 10.9 elementary schools, Similarly, the average
affected diocese loses more than 3,573 students, which is 16.2 percent of the
2001 average enrollment. From Panel B, we find that the decline is about 0.64
high schools and 366 students.
A.3 Different Data Set for Catholic Schools
As an additional check on the results related to enrollment at Catholic
schools, I obtain data from the National Catholic Educational Association on
the number of schools and students that attend both diocesan and Catholic
private schools. Table A.7 shows the estimates on all Catholic schools using
this data set. The estimates are very similar to those from the OCD presented
in Table 1.6. As a reminder, we do not see a significant effect on high school
enrollment since this data does not disaggregate between diocesan and private
schools.
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A.4 Parametric Event Study
With respect to some participation variables, some might be concerned
that there are existing trends that violate the standard parallel trends assump-
tion of the difference-in-differences model. In order to remedy this, I follow
Dobkin et al. (2018) and estimate a more parametric model that directly con-









The main differences between this and Equation 1.2 are twofold. Diocesan
linear time trends are included as
∑
D[υD × 1(d = D) · t] and the coefficients
on the interaction of Treatd with time fixed effects are only estimated for the
post period. Under this model, the identifying assumption holds that absent
the 2002 scandal, any pre-existing differential trends in the outcome variables
across dioceses would have continued as before.
Since the only estimates the interaction terms for the post-period, the
ζ1T do not give any good indication of whether the linear pre-trend fits the
data. As such, I follow Beheshti (2019) to rescale the β coefficients from
Equation 1.2 to equal the ζ coefficients when presenting the results. One can
then examine if there are any deviations from the linear pre-trend by seeing if
the new β coefficients differ from zero in the pre-period.
Figure A.6 provides both the original and the parametric event study
plots for the religious participation variables of infant baptism and First Com-
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munion. Comparing the two event studies for infant baptism in Panels A and
B, the reader finds that the coefficients deviate less from zero in the pre-period
when controlling for a linear pre-trend. Additionally, while the effect may be
attenuated, there are still statistically significant effects in the post-period.
For instance, the estimate for the rescaled β1,2006 implies a 7% decline in in-
fant baptisms. Similarly, one can say the same about the parametric event
study plot for log Catholic population in Panel B of A.7 when comparing it
to the original plot in Panel A. Additionally, Figure A.8 presents the event
study plots for the effect on the log number of diocesan schools and student
enrollment at the high school level. In Panel D, the event study plot suggests
that the effect on high school enrollment is attenuated and lags more than
in the original specification. Overall, the paper finds that these plots closely
resemble those resulting from the preferred specification of Equation 1.2.
A.5 Matching on Covariates
Another concern is that there is a a gulf when comparing the means
of dependent variables between treated and control dioceses in 2001 (Table
1.1). In an effort to remedy this, I use kernel propensity-score matching on
the common support.1 I match on the following covariates: the number of
first-time allegations, Hispanic percentage of the diocese, per capita income,
and population size. Table A.8 provides a summary of the same statistics
when propensity score matching is employed. Some of the largest treated
1I use the Epanechnikov kernel function and a kernel bandwidth of 0.06
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dioceses are dropped, including Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.
Additionally, we find that the means of the dependent variables are more
balanced between high and low allegation dioceses than previously. Tables A.9,
A.10, and A.11 provide the estimates of the effect on the different participation
outcomes. The estimates are largely similar to the original estimates. For
instance, infant baptisms decline by 10.6 percent which is a slightly larger
impact of the 7.9 percent estimated using the preferred specification.
Additionally, there are similar findings when matching on county char-
acteristics for the despair analysis. Table A.12 shows a more comparable
analysis when matching on the Hispanic percentage, Catholic percentage, per
capita income, and unemployment rate. In Table A.13, the estimates are
reduced but still statistically significant among men for causes related to ac-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Boston MA 103 Altoona-Johnstown PA 10
Manchester NH 45 Paterson NJ 10
Baltimore MD 34 San Diego CA 10
Los Angeles CA 34 Tucson AZ 10
Louisville KY 32 Grand Rapids MI 9
Cleveland OH 29 GreenBay WI 9
Detroit MI 25 Newark NJ 9
Rockville Centre NY 22 Springfield MA 9
New York NY 21 St. Petersburg FL 9
Chicago IL 20 Peoria IL 8
Portland OR 20 Sacramento CA 8
Fall River MA 19 Syracuse NY 8
St. Cloud MN 19 Camden NJ 7
Toledo OH 17 Hartford CT 7
Brooklyn NY 15 Portland ME 7
Joliet IL 14 Seattle WA 7
Milwaukee WI 14 St. Paul and Minn. MN 7
Philadelphia PA 14 Allentown PA 6
St. Louis MO 14 Burlington VT 6
Bridgeport CT 13 Cincinnati OH 6
Rochester NY 12 Evansville IN 6
Worcester MA 12 Lansing MI 6
Miami FL 11 Richmond VA 6
San Francisco CA 11 San Jose CA 6
Albany NY 10 Spokane WA 6
Note: This table displays the number of Catholic officials who for first-time
were accused of sexual abuse in the 50 high allegation dioceses in 2002. Data



























































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3: Effect of High Allegations on Incidence of Counties
with Mortality Rate ≥10 per 100,000 (Threshold > 3 Allegations),
Aged 55 to 64
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Accidental Overdose
Treat × Post 0.0117* 0.0085* 0.0072 0.0043
(0.0069) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0029)
> 5 allegations X X
> 3 allegations X X
No. of obs. 65,524 65,524 65,524 65,524
B. Suicide
Treat × Post 0.0175** 0.0118** 0.0008 0.0007
(0.0071) (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0012)
> 5 allegations X X
> 3 allegations X X
No. of obs. 65,524 65,524 65,524 65,524
C. Alcoholic Liver Disease
Treat × Post 0.0200** 0.0181** -0.0005 0.0004
(0.0082) (0.0062) (0.0035) (0.0025)
> 5 allegations X X
> 3 allegations X X
No. of obs. 65,524 65,524 65,524 65,524
Note: The outcome variables are indicators whether a county experienced a
mortality rate greater than 10 per 100,000 for each of the individual death
categories. Data comes from the CDC Wonder database for the years 1991-
2015. County and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered
at the diocesan level. County controls include percentage of population that is
Hispanic, per capita income, manufacturing employment, and unemployment



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.6: Effect of High Allegations on Diocesan Schools (Per
1,000,000)
Number of Schools Student Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Elementary Schools
Treat × Post -4.78*** -4.62*** -1611*** -1508***
(1.14) (1.16) (330.1) (328.9)
Controls X X
No. of obs. 4,537 4,537 4,539 4,539
B. High Schools
Treat × Post -0.3260*** -0.2682** -184.5*** -154.6**
(0.1259) (0.1173) (68.7) (69.1)
Controls X X
No. of obs. 4,106 4,106 4,107 4,107
Note: The outcome variable is is the labeled outcome per capita scaled up
by 1,000,000. The total annual population of those residing in the diocesan
boundaries is taken from the OCD. Diocesan and year fixed effects are in-
cluded. Standard errors are clustered at the diocesan level. Diocesan controls
include percentage of diocesan population that is Hispanic and per capita in-
come. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table A.7: Effect of High Allegations on Catholic Schools (NCEA)
Number of Schools Student Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Elementary Schools
Treat × Post -0.1197*** -0.1208*** -0.1370*** -0.1338***
(0.0298) (0.0292) (0.0299) (0.0304)
Controls X X
No. of obs. 3,312 3,313
B. High Schools
Treat × Post -0.0674** -0.0588** -0.0505 -0.0441
(0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0337) (0.0318)
Controls X X
No. of obs. 3,144 3,144
Note: The outcome variable is the log number of the labeled participation
outcome for all Catholic schools, i.e. both diocesan and private. Diocesan and
year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the diocesan
level. Diocesan controls include percentage of diocesan population that is
Hispanic and median household income. Data comes from the NCEA for
years 1997-2016. Using this secondary source of data, we find that the effects
on enrollment are attenuated when we combine diocesan and private school
data together. In order to get a clearer effect on the different types of schools,
NCES data is used, and results are presented in Table 1.5. *** p <0.01, ** p
<0.05, * p <0.1
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Table A.8: Averages of Key Church Variables by Matched High





No. of Dioceses 43 76.1
No. of Allegations 0.26 0.23
No. of Baptisms 7,347 5,418
No. of First Communions 7,176 4,879
No. of Confirmations 5,317 3,397
No. of Elementary Schools 61.2 31.55
No. of Elementary Students 18,290 9,365
No. of High Schools 6.09 3.57
No. of HS Students 3,522 1,930
No. of Parish Churches 148.3 92.8
Catholic Population 534,857 319,398
Total Population 1,977,537 2,173,741
Note: The table shows the means of key participation variables in 2001, one
year before the abuse scandal when using propensity score matching on the
common support. Matched covariates include total population, percent His-
panic, per capita income, and number of allegations. Allegation data comes


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.10: Effect of High Allegations on Catholic Population and
Parish Churches with Matching
Catholic Population Parish Churches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Post -0.0741** -0.1121*** -0.0813*** -0.0702***
(0.0325) (0.0409) (0.0195) (0.0217)
Mean
Dep. Var. 713,630 534,857 162.7 148.3
Matched X X
No. of obs. 4,562 3,114 4,563 3,114
Note: The outcome variables are the log of the Catholic population and the log
of the number of parish churches. Diocesan and year fixed effects are included.
Standard errors are clustered at the diocesan level. Diocesan controls include
percentage of diocesan population that is Hispanic and per capita income. Pre-
scandal (2001) means of the dependant variables from high allegation dioceses
are in italics. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table A.11: Effect of High Allegations on Diocesan Schools with
Matching
Number of Schools Student Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Elementary Schools
Treat × Post -0.1415*** -0.1731*** -0.1418*** -0.1712***
(0.0327) (0.0409) (0.0362) (0.0441)
Mean
Dep. Var. 71.6 61.2 22,050 18,290
Matched X X
No. of obs. 4,539 3,106 4,541 3,108
B. High Schools
Treat × Post -0.1644*** -0.1888*** -0.1871*** -0.1658**
(0.0380) (0.0522) (0.0564) (0.0646)
Mean
Dep. Var. 7.02 6.09 4,001 3,522
Matched X X
No. of obs. 4,108 2,898 4,109 2,898
Note: The outcome variable is log of the labeled participation outcome. This
provides the estimates when I match the treated and control dioceses using a
set of covariates including, the number of first-time allegations, the diocesan
Hispanic population, the total population, and the diocesan per capita income.
Diocesan and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at
the diocesan level. Diocesan controls include percentage of diocesan population
that is Hispanic and per capita income. Pre-scandal (2001) means of the
dependant variables from high allegation dioceses are in italics. *** p <0.01,
** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table A.12: Key County Level Mortality Statistics for Men, aged





No. of Counties 546 670.2
Average Group Population 10,147 6,530
Average Total Population 212,855 115,311
Average Group Overall Mortality Rate 1,194 1,276
Number of Counties with Group Mortality Rates ≥ 10 per 100,000
Suicide 17 14
Accidental Overdose 4 0
Liver Related 36 38
Note: The table shows key county level mortality statistics for the demo-
graphic group of men, aged 55 to 64, in 2001, one year before the abuse
scandal. There is data for 2,919 out of 3,141 counties in the United States.
All data comes from the compressed mortality files from the CDC Wonder
database.
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Table A.13: Effect of High Allegations on Incidence of Counties
with Mortality Rate ≥10 per 100,000 for People Aged 55 to 64
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Accidental Overdose
Treat × Post 0.0117* 0.0110 0.0072 0.0074
(0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0045) (0.0047)
Matched X X
No. of obs. 65,524 65,235 65,524 65,235
B. Suicide
Treat × Post 0.0175** 0.0181** 0.0008 0.0010
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Matched X X
No. of obs. 65,524 65,235 65,524 65,235
C. Alcoholic Liver Disease
Treat × Post 0.0200** 0.0157* -0.0005 -0.0016
(0.0082) (0.0089) (0.0035) (0.0037)
Matched X X
No. of obs. 65,524 65,235 65,524 65,235
Note: The outcome variables are indicators whether a county experienced a
mortality rate greater than 10 per 100,000 for each of the individual death
categories. This provides the estimates when I match the treated and control
dioceses using a set of covariates including, the county Hispanic population, the
proportion of the county total population that is Catholic, and the county per
capita income. Data comes from the CDC Wonder database for the years 1991-
2015. County and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered
at the diocesan level. County controls include percentage of population that is
Hispanic, per capita income, manufacturing employment, and unemployment
rate. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Appendix B
Disaggregated Event Study Plots
B.1 Standardized Math Scores
In a similar vein to the analysis in the main text, Figure B.1, Figure
B.2, and Figure B.3 respectively plot the event studies for (1) male and female
students, (2) white, black, and Hispanic students, and (3) gifted and at-risk
students. Unsurprisingly, each of the subgroups follow the qualitatively same
pattern of the event study for the aggregate effect on math scores shown in
Panel A of each figure.
The plots in in Figure B.2 are interesting. First, the effect on white stu-
dent math scores (Panel B) is -0.191 standard deviations and persists through-
out the time line. Both Black (Panel C) students experience similar effects to
that of white students in the year of installation. On the other hand, Hispanic
(Panel D) student do not experience as large an impact in the initial year. In
both of the subgroups, the negative effect dissipates within two years. The
difference between the estimates on the pooled effect of white and Hispanic
students, provided in Column 6 of Table 3.5, is quite large at 12 percent of a
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